The Foreign Service Journal, May 2017

40 MAY 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL • Third, we need to make it easier for State officers to volun- teer to serve on a task force or in a coordination unit, especially for extended periods of time. Given workforce shortages, it is likely that any task force or coordination unit is going to be very diverse and not necessarily experienced in international health— and that’s OK. The establishment of the Pandemic Response Team—and OES’ commitment to lead a task force with MED support if one is stood up—ensures that the core teamwill have the necessary expertise, but additional personnel will surely be needed. Pandemic response requires expertise in the areas of geopolitical, consular, legislative and public affairs, among oth- ers. It also requires skilled staff assistants, office management specialists and management officers. The Ebola Coordination Unit eventually consisted of two OES civil servants whose permanent assignments involved interna- tional health issues, an ambassador-designate awaiting confir- mation, an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow with an advanced degree in pharmacology, a Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs evacuee from Yemen, a medical evacuee, an unassigned management officer and an office management specialist temporarily reas- signed to support the team from the Office of the Counselor. What we lacked in experience was more thanmade up for by dedication and long hours. This shouldn’t be a surprise—it’s the norm for State Department crisis management. Yet though this rag-tag teamdeliveredmonth after month, burnout was a very real issue, and the ECU lacked a mechanism to rapidly transition in new staff, particularly those with skillsets matching current needs. • Fourth, State must continue to affirm its role within the interagency community during a pandemic. The department’s forward-leaning approach and reliable support in recent outbreaks has strengthened its reputation as coordinator and facilitator, as well as expanding the interagency’s appreciation of the numerous foreign affairs equities involved in any successful response. State’s seat at the interagency table provides a window into the complexity of a pandemic, particularly after it hits America’s shores, allowing senior State representatives to shape the response even if some measures are outside of their immediate mandate. Each outbreak will be unique, and we do not yet know how current or future administrations will choose to structure the U.S. government’s overall response. During the avian influenza outbreak of 2005, State took on a coordination role, leading an interagency task force that worked to support the international response. By the time the Ebola Coordination Unit was estab- lished in 2014, the National Security Council was clearly in charge of a multiple-agency effort that included deployment of military personnel, civilian health and development professionals, and large numbers of nongovernmental organization workers. State’s role was much more narrowly defined. We supported the president’s and the Secretary’s efforts to secure financial and other support; participated in press events and congressional briefings; coordinated with the United Nations as they slowly built up a presence in West Africa; helped formulate policies concerning travel to and from the affected areas; and coordinated with embassies in the affected areas. Each time a State task force or coordination unit is established, senior State officials should determine what role State will play and convey that clearly to the ambassador, the regional bureaus and other agencies. Strategic Approach Needed Finally, to return to our first lesson learned, State’s senior officials must think strategically about mitigating the impact of future, and potentially more frequent, pandemics on the depart- ment's mission. State needs to maintain—even in the face of anticipated bud- get cuts—the Pandemic Response Team and the broader Office of International Health and Biodefense, which works to increase other countries’ capacities to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks on their own. Regional bureaus, MED, Human Resources and Diplomatic Security need to plan for greater flexibility in meeting posts’ needs and requirements for evacuations, changes in staffing (increases in some areas; reductions in others) and visits by the regional medical officers; as well as plan for potential long-term effects on bidding patterns. Our diplomatic engagement was essential during the Ebola outbreak, and the State Department must continue to form the backbone of international efforts aimed at better preventing, detecting and responding to the infectious disease threats of the future. It is a matter of national security. n State has made demonstrable progress in acting on the lessons learned during the last decade, and there is tremendous opportunity for the new leadership to bolster these achievements.