The Foreign Service Journal, May 2018

22 MAY 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL run process. The consultancies labored under shifting direction and leadership, with “work streams” that were more siloed and stove-piped than integrated teams. Rather than accelerate reforms, the process sidelined and stalled initiatives by the bureaus of Human Resources and Information Resource Management and other bureaus that were already underway. From a change management perspective, Tillerson’s team heeded none of the experts in establishing a clear vision, ideal end state, timelines, champions or a coherent communications strategy. The changes prioritized back-office, legacy and operational matters (all of which must, of course, be addressed), but did so without first establishing strategic priorities and strengthening core functions and responsibilities. Déjà Vu All Over Again By focusing first on workforce numbers rather than strategic purpose, the initial actions began gutting the State Department of professionals with the experience, knowledge and judgment to articulate and execute policy and get results. Ignoring Govern- ment Accountability Office reports of the 1990s and mid-2000s that had sounded the alarm concerning the deleterious effects of staffing gaps and deficits at State, Tillerson and his advisers insisted on drastic cuts. In doing so, they flew in the face of history. Following the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, State had staffed 19 new embassies with existing personnel and flat budgets. That was fol- lowed by the Clinton-Gore “Reinvention of Government” exercise that saw steep budget and staffing cuts, and then the disbanding of the Arms Control and Disamament Agency and the merger into State of the U.S. Information Agency, engineered by Senator Jesse Helms. That exercise brought 2,100 employees into State without funding for their integration, but did not constitute a net gain in Foreign Service personnel. After 9/11, the department moved to expeditionary and trans- formative diplomacy, staffing two mega-missions in Afghanistan and Iraq through volunteers, while drawing down elsewhere to meet those needs. Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Hill- ary Clinton took action to address GAO concerns, and with the backing of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and Congress’ approved budgets, State hired new personnel to close staffing deficits. But State’s post-9/11 growth was highly uneven. To cite just a few prominent examples, since 1995 Diplomatic Security Bureau personnel increased by nearly 200 percent; con- sular personnel (processing visas for foreigners and passports for U.S. citizens) grew by more than 160 percent; and other specializa- tions grew by more than 100 percent. In contrast, core diplomatic staff grew by just 42 percent (2 percent on an annual basis), even as their responsibilities and overseas deployments to dangerous postings increased. At any given time, two-thirds of the Foreign Service is overseas, serving in more than 270 embassies and consulates. In dozens of posts, other agencies outnumber State Department personnel. Running into Facts The focus on budget cuts and workforce reductions also ran into stubborn facts. The proposed 31 percent budget cut for FY18 could not produce commensurate workforce savings. Five bureaus comprising 5 percent of the workforce accounted for 80 percent of the funds to be reduced (assistance, contributions to international agencies, exchanges). Even eliminating those bureaus entirely would yield only a 5 percent staff reduction. Tillerson eventually settled for an 8 percent total workforce reduction of U.S. direct-hire personnel by the end of September 2018. That number was arrived at only after more draconian reductions (on the order of 15 percent or more) were shelved because they would have required a costly and protracted reduc- tion-in-force exercise. The 8 percent downsizing was predicated on attrition, incentivized attrition (buyouts) and reduced intake. For FY17, intake was capped at 77 percent of attrition for the Foreign Service (the actual number was lower); for FY18, the cap was 40 percent of attrition. For the Civil Service, it was worse: zero hiring in FY17; and 25 percent of attrition in FY18. Because the Foreign Service brings in new employees in cohorts, reduced hiring has a generational impact, exacerbat- ing the types of deficits that GAO had previously identified. For the Civil Service, in particular, it means a collapse of expertise in key bureaus. No process improvements, which are geared to back-office functions, will make up for the resulting policy and operational shortfalls. When defending staffing numbers Tillerson’s staff often pointed to the fact that the State Department employs 75,000 worldwide, suggesting its workforce is huge. But 50,000 of those employees are local nationals, the majority of whom perform security work (approximately 37,000), initial visa screening and other essential internal operational activities that support several dozen other federal agencies at overseas missions. Those local employees were never part of the reduction exercise—that exer- cise was targeted at the 24,775 U.S. direct-hire Foreign and Civil Service personnel on the rolls as of Jan. 31, 2017. To hit the mark of 1,982 fewer employees and account for mini- mal (well below attrition) hiring, approximately 2,300 employees would need to leave the rolls—a huge and disruptive churn. Even