The Foreign Service Journal, May 2018

24 MAY 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL tapped from the Bureau of Consular Affairs’ fee-generated rev- enues for departmentwide IT needs. In short, the FY19 budget proposal is a shell game of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Moreover, State’s payroll costs are less than 10 percent of its total budget, a budget that also supports physical and virtual pres- ence to expand U.S. influence even where programs are declining. State provides a security and administrative platformoverseas for more than 30 other U.S. government agencies, many of which have increased their overseas footprint and need for services that State provides. Cutting State’s budget would have wide repercussions. Three conclusions about the administration's budget propos- als were painfully obvious: The Trump administration looked to ignore Congress, which favors healthier funding for State; if enacted, the budget would make State more a support service for other agencies than a strong diplomatic agent; and it would generate a diplomatic void that Russia, China and other adversar- ies will gladly exploit. In March Congress passed and President Trump signed an omnibus spending bill. It calls, inter alia, for the State Depart- ment’s Inspector General to review the “Redesign” to ensure it used proper processes and included employee input. State is also required to report to Congress on actions it took in response to Trump’s reorganization directive to all federal cabinet agencies and subsequent guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. Congress further noted that it expects State to maintain FS and CS staff levels on board as of Dec. 31, 2017. Under this budget, State avoids the most deleterious conse- quences of painful cuts, but is far from being put on an upward trajectory in building diplomatic capacity for the future. It is still necessary to address structural rigidities, anomalies and misalign- ments. And it is essential to redress systemic underinvestment in people (the entire human capital development life cycle) and information technology. Moreover, by itself this budget does not address State’s and diplomacy’s marginalization as an instrument of U.S. leadership. An Uncertain Future All of this has had a predictable, debilitating effect on the State Department and its employees, who have long wanted con- structive change. Indeed, the professionals at State had already launched numerous reform initiatives to strengthen the depart- ment; many were stalled as the focus shifted to the “Redesign/ TII.” To cite only a few projects already underway: a new IT architecture (including email and messaging systems; data hygiene, migration, integrity and visualization); new performance management systems for both the Foreign and Civil Service; new assignment and deployment patterns for the Foreign Service, with streamlined referral/vetting procedures; increased empha- sis on talent acquisition and diversity and inclusion programs; enhanced professional and leadership development training, better coaching and mentorship programs; rationalized bureaus, deputy assistant secretary positions and special envoys; and expanded and enhanced shared service models. These internal reforms were all designed to fuel performance and productivity by reducing internal clutter and complexity and focusing on external goal delivery. All took a back seat during the extended hiring freeze and workforce reduction exercise. In short, State lost time and momentum. Instead it devotes staff power to the “FOIA surge” (whittling down the backlog of Freedom of Information requests), widely perceived as an exercise to drive people out by displacing them to tasks incommensurate with their diplomatic skills and experience, while higher priority national security objectives are underserved. The stated objective of the TII is to “improve efficiency, effec- tiveness and accountability” and to give staff more fulfilling and rewarding careers. Surveys have consistently shown that employ- ees are “fulfilled” when given responsibility to carry out well- articulated policy in furtherance of U.S. national security. Instead, Sec. Tillerson walled himself off from employees and embarked on an exercise that degraded rather than boosted operational and diplomatic capacity. Fewer employees and lower budgets rarely produce great results in a diplomatic arena where intractable problems bedevil policymakers and initiative, judgment and expertise are at a premium. Amore strategic approach would be to aim for responsibil- ity (empowering people and rewarding initiative and judgment); effectiveness (defining and successfully driving policy outcomes that advance U.S. values, interests and goals); and efficiency (reshaping programs and processes to focus on goal delivery, not Fewer employees and lower budgets rarely produce great results in a diplomatic arena where intractable problems bedevil policymakers and initiative, judgment and expertise are at a premium.