The Foreign Service Journal, May 2018

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2018 43 expectations—foreign nationals still constitute the vast majority of employees in the Saudi private sector—the growing demand for jobs for Saudis and the public sector’s inability to satisfy that demand both lend a new urgency to the effort. MBS is also shaking up his country’s power structure, which has long featured a dynamic tension between the ruling Al Saud family and the arch-conservative religious establishment that promotes the austere Wahhabi doctrine originally espoused by the 18th-century Islamic cleric Mohamed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. By asserting that the Saudi government would seek to place Saudi Arabia’s religious practices closer to the mainstream of Sunni Islam, thereby returning the country to its pre-1979 practices, Mohamed bin Salman has taken steps to curtail the power and authority of the religious establishment. So, for example, his decisions concerning the roles and participation of women in Saudi society have upended decades of religious doctrine aimed at confining them largely to roles as homemakers. In addition, the government recently restricted the hitherto unchecked authority of the dreaded mutawa’een (reli- gious police) to enforce Wahhabi strictures. These decisions are broadly popular with younger, urbanized Saudis (although likely less popular among more conserva- tive religious elements and citizens in the religious heartland). Similarly, steps to introduce aspects of “normal” urban life to the country, including reintroducing movie theaters and permitting music concerts, albeit still gender-segregated, have improved the quality of life for young Saudis and reduced intergenerational frictions. Dim Prospects for Political Change In his first year as crown prince, Mohamed bin Salman, with the approval of his father, King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, has imple- mented the most sweeping changes in generations. But there is no indication that he intends to match his dramatic moves on the social and economic fronts with equally substantial reforms of the country’s governing structures. In fact, indications are that Saudi Arabia under King Salman and the crown prince will remain an authoritarian state, with little scope offered for popular participa- tion, let alone peaceful political dissent. Authorities continue to arrest and imprison Saudi citizens merely for criticizing the government or participating in peaceful protests. Nearly all members of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association have been imprisoned for their pro-rights advocacy, according to Human Rights Watch. Several bloggers and social media activists, including women advocating for improved wom- en’s rights and the prominent blogger Raif Badawi, have been sentenced to extended prison terms for their activism. In a stun- ning display of authoritarian power, late last year the government detained dozens of the country’s wealthiest and most prominent businessmen and senior government officials for weeks in the five-star Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh, on allegations of corrup- tion. The detainees were held until they agreed to return to the government billions of dollars—some reports suggest the final figure was in excess of $100 billion—in alleged corrupt payoffs. There is little doubt that corruption in Saudi Arabia is a signifi- cant impediment to economic reform. Steps by the government to root it out would undoubtedly improve the business climate and attract greater foreign and domestic investment. Moreover, by all accounts, the government’s move against those accused of cor- ruption was generally popular with Saudi citizens. In a March 18 interview with Norah O’Donnell of “60 Minutes,” Mohamed bin Salman insisted that the Ritz-Carlton detentions were “extremely necessary.” But as one close observer of the Saudi scene has noted, the anti-corruption drive was the right thing to do, but done in the wrong way. The crown prince insisted that all of the procedures “were in accordance with existing and pub- lished laws,” but they do not appear so to many observers. Instead of building systems to stem corruption through a strong legal framework and judicial review, thus building confidence in the rule of law, the state chose to shake down the accused in an opaque process without ever being called on to prove the charges in court. By arguing that the action was justified by a sense of urgency preventing the use of more formal legal channels, the government lost an opportunity to build the kind of framework that will benefit Saudi society over the long term. For generations, the theory of governance in Saudi Arabia was that the population would accept the absolute rule of the Al Saud family in return for prosperity and stability. The question, now, therefore, is how reduction, or even the elimination, of core ele- ments in the social safety net will affect the population’s expecta- tions. Accommodating the demand of young Saudis for loosened Indications are that Saudi Arabia will remain an authoritarian state, with little scope offered for popular participation.