The Foreign Service Journal, May 2018

48 MAY 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 1 icnl.org/research/monitor/ethiopia.html 2 icnl.org/research/monitor/zimbabwe.html 3 usaid.gov/middle-east-civil-society 4 usaid.gov/asia-civil-society 5 ipa.united4iran.org/en/prisoner/ 6 amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/09/iran-shameful-16-year-sentence-for-narges-mohammadi-a-devastating-blow-to-human-rights/ Tactic Description Governments intentionally obscure the legal permissions required for civil society actors and organizations. CSOs can be dissolved under thin pretense, with the uncer- tainty driving self-censorship and undercutting long-term planning. Governments impose odious registration requirements, impeding the establishment and operation of organiza- tions. Broad provisions give restrictive governments license to deny registration to any viable organization they view as a potential threat. Governments require organizations to screen individual activities, allowing government agents to closely monitor activities and filter any unfavorable actions. Governments have taken a variety of approaches to drain organizations’ resources—for instance, denying tax benefits, levying fees and imposing stiff bureaucratic penalties for any noncompliance. Foreign funding can be a critical source of revenue for civil society, whether from diaspora groups, bilateral donors or multinational organizations. Governments have hampered civil society by taxing, diminishing or blocking such funding. Authoritarian regimes continue to stifle opposing voices; as activists have turned to the internet and social media to communicate, repressive governments have kept pace with online censorship and digital attacks. Some countries have criminalized failure to comply with certain CSO law provisions, such as registration and reporting. To maintain a pretext of civil society without risking opposition, regimes frequently establish government- organized NGOs (GONGOs) that act as proxies for the ruling regime, mimicking official positions while crowding out other civil society actors. Regimes resort to smear campaigns to undercut CSOs’ legitimacy and popularity; labeling groups as puppets of foreign powers is common, as are defamatory claims against oppositional individuals. Governments employ techniques such as attacks on peaceful demonstrators, threats to civil society organiza- tion personnel, arbitrary detention, arrest and prosecu- tion with draconian sentences, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, digital surveillance and the criminal- ization of civil society internet use. Country Examples Cambodia enacted a new Law on Associations and NGOs in August 2015 that, among other provisions, bans unregistered organizations while vaguely defining which groups are required to register; requires “political neutrality” of CSOs; and gives the Ministry of Interior full control over registration. In South Sudan , a 2016 law imposes substantial and costly registra- tion renewal, documentation and hiring requirements. It prevents CSOs from engaging in activities other than those agreed on in advance with the government; requires expatriates to secure work permits before arriving in South Sudan; and removes some legal recourse for CSOs appealing government decisions. The government of Azerbaijan has lost at least five cases before the European Court of Human Rights, which has found denials of registra- tion to violate the freedom of association. In Ethiopia , charities and societies raising more than 10 percent of their income from foreign sources may not engage in activities listed in Article 14 (j-n) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation, including advancement of human and democratic rights; promotion of equality and rights of the disabled and children; conflict resolu- tion; and promotion of efficiency in judicial and law enforcement services. 1 In Zimbabwe , some CSOs are forced by local authorities to pay exorbitant fees (up to $1,000 per year) to carry out their work. If an organization refuses, no Memorandum of Understanding is granted and the CSO’s activities are not allowed to proceed. 2 In October 2016, Bangladesh enacted the Foreign Donations Regula- tion Law, which includes new administrative hurdles and penalties for foreign-funded NGOs for vague offenses such as “making derogatory statements against the Constitution and constitutional bodies.” Since 2012, Russia has intensified a crackdown on freedom of expression online, threatening user privacy and secure communica- tion, and instituting greater controls over content. Measures such as local data storage laws make it easier for the authorities to identify users and access personal information without judicial oversight. While these measures are in the early stages of implementation—and the extent to which they can and will be enforced remains unclear— the message about greater state control is clear. In Egypt , a new, extremely restrictive NGO bill ratified by the presi- dent in May 2017 gave a legal role to security and intelligence officials in deciding on the registration of NGOs and their ability to access domestic and foreign funding. Under the bill, violations carry very harsh penalties ranging from one to five years’ imprisonment in addi- tion to fines ranging from 50,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $3,125) to one million Egyptian pounds (approximately $62,500). 3 Russia provides grant funding to NGOs through the Presidential Grant Foundation for the Development of Civil Society. Though it is possible to interpret these grants as a concession to restrictions on NGOs receiving foreign funding, the majority of the available resources went to pro-government groups. For others, the presiden- tial grants represent possible co-optation by the state, particularly as other funding options decrease in the face of legislative and other pressures. These groups must weigh whether accepting public financing places them at risk of becoming GONGOs. President Duterte’s public statements in the Philippines against crit- ics of his war against illegal drugs, including human rights groups, are seen as attempts to silence dissent. 4 In Iran , more than 700 human rights defenders and political activists, such as Abdolfattah Soltani, remain in prison for their peaceful activi- ties. 5 In May 2016, a revolutionary court sentenced prominent Iranian human rights activist Narges Mohammadi, who had been detained for a year, to a total of 16 years in prison on charges of“membership in the banned campaign Step by Step to Stop the Death Penalty”andmeet- ing with the former E.U. High Representative for ForeignAffairs. 6 CLOSING SPACE: TACTICS AND EXAMPLES Loose or vague legal frameworks. Burdensome civil society organization registration. Denial of registration. Approval for activities. Unfavorable taxes and fees. Limits on external funding. Restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. Criminalization. Government- sponsored competition. Defamation. Violence and intimidation.