The Foreign Service Journal, May 2018

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2018 49 dering and support is waning, they act swiftly to eliminate opposition. Just as inter- rupting a medical regimen may induce drug-resistant disease strains, sporadic sup- port provides autocrats with opportunities to stifle vibrant civil society organizations, replacing them with so-called “government-organized non- governmental organizations” (GONGOs). GONGOs mimic civil society and effectively crowd out competing organi- zations. Diplomacy is a criti- cal complementary tool to development for promoting civil society in closing spaces. Diplomatic pressure must be applied, sustained and leveraged most strongly during politically tense periods; governments are most likely to attack civil society in the run-up to elections, for example. Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Community of Democracies and Open Government Partnerships aim to serve as platforms to identify, alert and respond to threats to democracy, and to support and defend civic space. Civil society actors must also be included in conversations with high-level visitors, ensuring that they maintain visibility and are recog- nized as important players in the political process. Sustained efforts also depend on strengthening and expanding existing CSO networks, pooling resources and cross-pollinating strong ideas. Finally, donors and operating units working in closing spaces must create and maintain opportunities for staff to rou- tinely share challenges, resources and best practices to ensure that the agency as a whole stays current with this cross-cutting trend. USAID offers a three-day, in-person course, “Supporting Civil Society in Closing Spaces,” to its Washington and field- based officers to better equip them with the tools needed to work in these highly challenging environments. USAID also recently launched an agencywide Closing Spaces Commu- nity of Practice, which will build on the knowledge base of its members and their extended networks to disseminate informa- tion—including best practices and policy, as well as legal, con- tractual and operational resources—so that missions are better prepared to address closing space in individual countries. A reporter in Yerevan, Armenia, scuffles with a police officer while covering a protest against the demolition of a historic building in 2015. PHOTOLUR/IREX/COURTESYOFUSAID A More Resilient Landscape According to CIVICUS, almost one in 10 people live in a country with fully closed civic space, and more than a third of the world’s population lives in countries with repressed civic space. In the post-Cold War era, states around the world have gained independence and liberal freedoms, only to fall prey to autocratic repression. For the U.S. government and its partners, operating in closing space demands exceptional considerations. Commitments to accountability and transparency must be weighed against the risks posed to local partners. The benefits of a specific program must be weighed against potential backlash to a full develop- ment portfolio. Contingency plans for suspended access or I n most countries in Africa, state and nonstate actors— through the use of restrictive legislation, policies and judicial persecution, as well as physical attacks, threats and detention of activists and journalists—stifle freedom of expression, assembly and association. We realized that most of these restrictions occur when civil society groups speak out against a specific public policy. We also started to see that the restrictions increase during politically sensitive periods, like elections and prior to constitutional changes on term limits of political leaders. —Charles Vandyck, West African Civil Society Institute