The Foreign Service Journal, May 2019

20 MAY 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL our misadventures in the Middle East. Imagine if a bigger part of the time, energy and resources spent on the Global War on Terror had instead been spent on giving form to an affirmative vision for America’s role in Asia. We would be in a much stronger place to shape developments in the region and compete more effectively. Instead, all too often, we find ourselves on the defensive, playing catch-up. But as I try to make clear in the book, we still have significant assets and advantages to draw on in the region—especially our alliances, which distinguish us from lonelier powers like China, or Russia for that matter. Managing competition with China will be the central task of American statecraft for decades to come. That’s what navigating great power rivalry is all about—maneu- vering in the gray area between peace and war; exhibiting a healthy grasp of the limits of the possible; building leverage; exploring common ground where we can find it; and pushing back firmly and persistently where we can’t. I don’t think we’re doomed to conflict with China, but there are real risks ahead. Adroit American diplomacy will be more crucial here than anywhere else—not only directly with the Chi- nese, but with a wider web of players across Asia. They may not all want to contain China, but they all want to ensure that its rise doesn’t come at their expense. FSJ: With the United States’ decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Russia saying it will follow suit, are we heading for a new arms race? Is there anything U.S. diplomats can do to mitigate this? WJB: We’re heading into very rough waters. However pro- found our differences—and they truly are profound—the United States and Russia have unique capabilities and unique respon- sibilities to reduce global nuclear threats. It’s cold-bloodedly in both our interests to do so, and certainly in the interests of the wider international community. Russia had been violating the INF Treaty for a number of years. We may ultimately have had no alternative but to leave the treaty; I just wish we had worked more creatively to lay out our case for Russian violations, reassure our allies and explore ways to fix the problem. My broader hope is that the collapse of INF doesn’t fore- shadow the demise of what’s left of the U.S.-Russia arms control architecture. It would be especially dangerous to let the New START Treaty lapse in 2021. We ought to be engaging the Rus- sians now on New START, and in serious strategic stability talks, particularly given the increasingly uncertain entanglement of nuclear systems with advanced conventional weaponry, missile defense and cyber tools. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns greets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Andrews Air Force Base during his first visit to the United States on Sept. 29, 2014. COURTESYOFGOVERNMENTOF INDIAPRESS INFORMATIONBUREAU