The Foreign Service Journal, May 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2019 21 FSJ: You were instrumental in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Now that the United States has pulled out of the agreement, what advice do you have for U.S. officials trying to forge a diplomatic path forward for dealing with Tehran? WJB: I’mnot undecided on this one. It was an historic mistake to abandon the JCPOA, one more reminder that it’s easier to tear down diplomacy than to build it. We spent years painstakingly corralling an international coali- tion, and building economic and political lever- age. Then we applied it in direct diplomacy with Iran, working closely with our international partners. As in any complicated diplomatic effort, we didn’t produce a perfect agreement. “Perfect” is rarely on the menu in diplomacy. What we did produce was the best of the avail- able alternatives, an agreement unprecedented in its verification provisions and intrusiveness, sharply constraining Iran’s civilian nuclear programover a long period, and preventing it fromdeveloping a nuclear weapon. Now we’ve thrown that away, at least as a matter of American policy, and we’re isolating ourselves instead of isolating the Ira- nian regime. Withdrawal makes it harder, not easier, to deal with Iran’s threatening behavior throughout the Middle East, and it further erodes international confidence in America’s willingness to hold up our end of diplomatic bargains. It creates even more fissures in relations with our closest European allies—in effect doing Vladimir Putin’s work for him. So other than that, I think withdrawal from the deal was a great idea. As for America’s diplomats, they are faithfully implementing the new policy, as they should be. But I hope that we’ll still be alert for opportunities for hard-nosed diplomatic engagement with Tehran where it suits both of our interests. That’s certainly the case in Afghanistan, where Iran has a stake and the capacity to either help or hinder the political settlement that this adminis- tration is rightly working to reach. FSJ: In light of all the other U.S. government players (Depart- ment of Defense, National Security Council and numerous agencies) inWashington, D.C., and overseas, what is the best role for State? Should the State Department be the lead agency for formulating and implementing foreign policy? WJB: For better or worse, we will never again enjoy the monop- oly we once had—or imagined we had—in foreign policymaking and execution. We have to come to terms with that. There are sim- ply toomany players, toomany issues and too few resources. But State ought to be the conductor of the foreign policy orchestra. That means bringing together the soft power of ideas, economic incen- tives and sanctions, intelligence-gathering and covert action, mili- tary assistance, and the threat of force to achieve policy aims. State has a unique coordinating role inmobilizing the levers of Ameri- can influence, and unique capacity to understand and navigate foreign landscapes. Led by strong ambassadors, embassy country teams remain an especially goodmechanism. We’ve proven we can play all those roles effectively, when given the chance. FSJ: When you retired from the State Department, you pub- lished your “10 Parting Thoughts for America’s Diplomats” in Foreign Policy . It’s a great list, worth repeating: Know where you come from. It’s not always about us. Master the fundamentals. Stay ahead of the curve. Promote economic renewal. Connect leverage to strategy. Don’t just admire the problem—offer a solution. Speak truth to power. Accept risk. Remain optimistic. Looking back at the four years since you wrote that list, would you add any lessons to it? WJB: One of the occupational hazards for recovering diplo- mats like me is an addiction to offering more and more unsolic- ited advice. I think that earlier list still holds up pretty well. But picking up on the image of diplomats as gardeners that George Shultz and George Kennan both used, highlighting the constant William Burns (at left), then special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, meets with President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Adviser Colin Powell and other senior advisers in the Oval Office in December 1988. U.S.DEPARTMENTOFSTATE