The Foreign Service Journal, May 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2019 51 in protecting their own citizens. Their armies and police exist mainly to protect the government and not the nation as a whole or its citizens. Enhancing the capability of security forces alone will only strengthen their ability to keep that regime in power and to suppress any democratic alternatives. In 2006, in tacit recognition of this problem, U.N. member- states established the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which holds that it is the primary obligation of a govern- ment to protect its own citizens. Since R2P was created, the Security Council has passed 75 resolutions reminding govern- ments of their obligation to protect their own citizens. Of that number, 41 were directed at the five countries where protec- tion and stabilization missions are now taking place. The R2P principle also holds that if the government fails to protect its own citizens, the international community may step in to do so. Because the governments of these countries are either unwilling or unable to provide such security, the peacekeep- ers are being asked to do so. Since the wealthy nations with the most capable armies are unwilling to provide a sig- nificant number of troops, this most dangerous and difficult type of peacekeeping is left largely to poorly equipped and trained soldiers from developing countries who are not going to defeat violent extremism. If the United States cannot prevail against violent extremists in Afghanistan after 18 years of trying, there is no chance that the available peacekeepers can succeed in Africa. And asking peacekeepers to die protecting the citizens of a country whose government will not is unlikely to inspire them to make that sacrifice. The most recently launched peacekeeping missions will therefore fail, because U.N. peacekeeping has become a way for rich countries to send the soldiers of poor countries to deal with conflicts the rich countries do not care all that much about. The fundamental problem is that there is no peace to keep, and U.N. forces are incapable of imposing one because they are peace- keepers and not warfighters. If the international community wants to try to impose a peace, it should send troops that are capable and willing to do that. Such a solution is not going to happen, however. It is far easier to identify a policy problem than to come up with realistic recommendations to fix it. Peacekeeping is a bandage, not a cure, for the scourge of violent extremism. At best, it can stanch the bleeding, but cannot heal the wound. But it is used nonethe- less, because it is the easy alternative. A Better Approach Neither peacekeepers nor the typical reaction of govern- ments—more violence—will be able to prevent violent extrem- ism. There is one approach that holds promise, but whether the international community has the will, attention span and unity to take it is doubtful. In 2017 the United Nations Development Program inter- viewed 495 young African men who had voluntarily joined violent extremist groups. The study found they were motivated by a sense of grievance toward, and a lack of confidence in, their governments. For them, the extremist ideologies were a way to escape a future with no pos- sibility of positive change. The study concluded that improved public policy and governance was a far more effective response to violent extremism than a military one. However, governments— especially in the five countries where the protection and stabilization missions are taking place in Africa—will not lessen their corruption, repression and incompetence simply because it is the right thing to do. These countries, as underdeveloped politically as they are economically, have weak legislative and judicial branches of government and little in the way of civil society or press freedom. The incentive to govern better will have to come from outside forces. To ensure the necessary changes do happen, the interna- tional community should apply substantial and consistent economic and political pressure and sanctions against all those responsible for the creation of these situations. The five coun- tries should be declared de facto failed states, and international organizations put in charge of the governments’ finances. Any aid to or trade with these countries should be made contingent on the attainment of better governance, human rights and adherence to democratic norms. To do that effectively, other countries and a wide range of organizations would have to make peace the top priority instead of placing their own vested interests first. That will require addressing the problem, not just dumping it in the lap of the United Nations and making the peacekeepers take the blame for failure because it is the easier thing to do. n The fundamental problem is that there is no peace to keep, and U.N. forces are incapable of imposing one because they are peacekeepers and not warfighters.