The Foreign Service Journal, May 2019

72 MAY 2019 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL A Blueprint for Reducing Violence A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security Rachel Kleinfeld, Pantheon Books, 2018, $28.95/hardcover, $14.99/Kindle, 475 pages. Reviewed by Frankie Sturm Colombia was a dangerous place in the 1990s. Cartels and paramilitar- ies operated with impunity. Guerrillas kidnapped and extorted with abandon. In 1991, Colombia’s homicide rate was more than eight times epidemic levels. Simply put, Colombians suffered from a staggering level of violence. Thankfully, that changed. Homicide, kidnapping, terror attacks—they’ve all plummeted. Violence hasn’t disap- peared, but the changes translate into hundreds of thousands of human lives. As the State Department website puts it: “Colombia has transformed itself over the past 20 years from a fragile state to a vibrant democracy.” What changed? Rachel Kleinfeld answers that question in A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Coun- tries Can Forge a Path to Security. With examples as diverse as Colombia, Geor- gia, India and Italy, Kleinfeld shows how countries beset by violence can change course. She structures the book around five ideas. First, violence isn’t an accident. It’s a strategy. Kleinfeld coins the term “Privilege Violence” to describe cases where elites collude with violent groups or use the state for their own narrow purposes. Violence is typically the result of complicity, not weakness. The book’s second supposition is that entire societies decivilize. Privilege Violence starts at the top, but it doesn’t stay there. When ordi- nary people fear their government and distrust their neighbors, some become violent. This unleashes a vicious circle. It’s not just mercenaries who kill. It’s everyday people who have nothing to lose. Who breaks the cycle? The middle class. That’s the third thesis. Privilege Violence benefits a small elite. It choses its victims wisely. It preys on the mar- ginalized and tries to keep the middle class reasonably secure. When leaders from the middle class organize their fellows, they can beat back Privilege Violence. Since the middle class is too broad to privilege a single societal stratum, its reforms are biased toward a fair playing field for everyone. Yet it’s not enough to enlist the middle class. Governments have to cut deals with bad actors. That’s premise number four. Some monsters will go to prison, but not all of them. Otherwise, no one would renounce violence. But there’s a caveat. Dirty deals are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. If they are allowed to stand, they will send a state back into violence. In the short term, however, they can buy time for politicians to insti- tutionalize reforms that build a more just state. These politicians are often flawed vessels, but with support from the middle class, they are the bureau- cratic instigators of change. Lastly, states and societies re-civilize together. A community policing program won’t help if the state lets murderers go free. And reformers won’t get anything done if voters don’t trust them. Once again, the middle class is crucial. It is the connective tissue between state and society. With exercise, its muscles get stronger and its streets get safer. That’s Colombia’s story. Privilege Vio- lence spilled over into broader society. By the 1990s, the middle class had had enough. Colombia adopted a new constitution that granted representation to Colombians of all political stripes. Simulta- neously, guerrilla groups over- played their hand. Citizens lined up behind an effort to root them out. This included an amnesty that persuaded paramilitaries to disarm, allowing the state to fight two sources of violence at once. Plan Colombia played an important role, as well, largely because it had the support of both state and society. Add it all up and you get a massive reduction in violence. While A Savage Order offers both a theoretical framework and a set of practical recommendations for foreign policy practitioners, it does leave a few questions open. What’s the difference between a dirty deal that buys time and a dirty deal that entrenches elites? How does one distinguish between a compromised reformer and a would-be autocrat? Are there case studies that illustrate these differences? With examples as diverse as Colombia, Georgia, India and Italy, Kleinfeld shows how countries beset by violence can change course. BOOKS