The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

32 MAY 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL grail for future nuclear arms treaties is to figure out how to elimi- nate warheads and verify that process, since neither the United States nor Russia so far has been willing to have foreign inspec- tors poke around in sensitive nuclear warhead facilities. I do think we are now on the cusp of grasping that holy grail, and I want to make a plea for continued innovation in the arms control arena. We decided to innovate in the New START Treaty by not pursuing the counting rule approach that had been used in START. We had determined those counting rules on the basis of the maximum number of warheads with which a given missile had been tested. The heavy Russian SS-18 ICBMs, for example, were designated under the counting rule to carry 10 warheads each. In New START we went beyond the counting rule approach to actually confirm the number of objects declared to be on the front end of a missile—both nuclear warheads and non-nuclear objects (e.g., missile defense decoys). We do this through on-site inspections that are focused on the missile reentry vehicles— their front ends—where we actually determine which are objects that are non-nuclear. Therefore, we have a better picture of how many nuclear warheads the Russians are actually deploying. This is the kind of innovation that will help us to begin to reduce and eliminate nuclear warheads, and we need to con- tinue to develop these kinds of tools so that we can grasp this holy grail in the not-too-distant future. It is precisely where the Trump administration wants to go in its efforts to seek limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads, which are usually held in stor- age and not operationally deployed on a day-to-day basis. I am convinced we can do it. The Way Ahead The need of the hour is to reflect on what the long arc of our experience has taught us in the nuclear arms control arena, and think about better treaties for the future. First, we have learned how to do verification better over time. The on-site inspection regimes of today could not have been imagined when Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT I Treaty in 1972. We are now, as I described above, getting to the point when we can begin to control and limit warheads, because we can imag- ine how to inspect the process. We need to think through how we would develop new warhead verification regimes. Second, national technical means (NTM), the satellites and radars that are controlled by governments, have gained in sophistication and coverage over time. That they should not be interfered with during treaty implementation is a well-accepted principle of arms control practice. How NTM should be devel- oped and used in future treaties is now ripe for consideration. We should consider how the new tools on offer, such as the com- mercial satellite networks, can be fitted into the processes and procedures that we have honed over 50 years of experience with nuclear arms limitation and reduction. Third, we understand now how to structure treaties to ensure that they actually achieve limitations on and elimination of nuclear weapons systems—missiles, bombers, submarines. Our procedures for conversion or elimination of these systems are well understood; we knowwhat worked and what did not work in the past. Can some of that experience be adjusted to the elimination of nuclear warheads, or do we have to think completely outside the box? Luckily, there has been a wealth of good work at our national laboratories and in the nongovernmental community on this topic. I am not at all pessimistic about this future, despite the challenges it holds. Certain tensions, such as over the offense- defense relationship, are not going to go away and will have to be dealt with. Likewise, when more countries, first of all China, become invited to the arms control table, the negotiations become more complicated. To begin with, Beijing will have to be convinced that its interests are served by joining in the negotia- tions. Finally, the debate within the U.S. political system as to whether or not arms control negotiations serve our national security interest will always be a factor. That calculation, in my view, must be made in every treaty setting and throughout a treaty’s lifetime. When the Russians violated the INF Treaty to the point that it was being hollowed out, it was time for the United States to leave. While New START provides us with predictability about the Russian strategic force structure and prevents Moscow from building up its nuclear weapons, it is clearly in our interest to stay. We must be clear- eyed when nuclear arms control is serving us well, but not shy away from admitting when it fails us. I will end where I began: Nuclear arms control is the only way that we can attain stable and predictable deployments of these most fearsome weapons, and it is the only way that we can ensure we won’t be bankrupted by nuclear arms racing. n The need of the hour is to reflect on what the long arc of our experience has taught us in the nuclear arms control arena, and think about better treaties for the future.