The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

34 MAY 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL This departure from proven and effective nuclear risk reduc- tion and arms control strategies is a matter of urgent concern, because, among other things, we face a higher risk of a U.S.-Rus- sian nuclear war than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Proven Rules of the Road Previous U.S. presidents understood that talking to an adver- sary is not a sign of weakness, but a hardheaded and realistic means to reduce an existential threat posed to the United States. They came to realize that well-crafted arms control and nonpro- liferation treaties provide rules of the road that enable the United States to more effectively pursue its economic and security interests. As Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin argued in their seminal 1961 study, Strategy and Arms Control , nuclear weapons limitation agreements with adversaries can help achieve three critical foreign policy objectives: “the avoidance of war that neither side wants, minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.” Throughout the nuclear age, U.S. policymakers—from William Foster, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz and Brent Scowcroft to John Kerry and Rose Gottemoeller—have pursued arms control agreements because they are a vital tool that can constrain other nations’ ability to act against our interests, while still allowing the freedom of action that is necessary to defend U.S. interests and those of our close allies. In other words, arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, nor a favor done for another nation; they are an essential component of, and contributor to, our national security. The history of the nuclear age also shows that the United States, as the world’s first and most sophisticated nuclear weap- ons power, must play an active role as a global leader on nuclear security matters, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Negotiating to end the arms race, achieve reductions of nuclear stockpiles and, eventually, eliminate all nuclear weapons is not only a moral obligation, but a legal obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since its approval by the U.S. Senate in 1969. These goals can and must be pursued, regardless of the ups and downs of great-power rela- tions. Most U.S. presidents have come to recognize that the pursuit of these goals is not an option, but a priority. Mutual assured destruction is not a theory or a philosophy; it is a reality. Once the Soviet Union achieved reliable intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1960s, neither the United States nor Russia could launch a nuclear attack on the other’s homeland without the near-certain destruction of its own homeland. New Road, No Rules In a departure from this history, the Trump administration has abandoned U.S. leadership in the arms control field and seems guided by a contrary set of assertions that have gained salience on the hawkish side of the Republican party, namely: • The United States should not discuss vital national security issues, or consider compromise, with adversaries such as Iran until they have fully met U.S. demands in all fields. • Arms control agreements grant unwarranted concessions to opponents, and they constrain the United States’ freedom of action. (This has been the guiding principle for John Bolton, former national security adviser and a serial assassin of arms control agreements.) • Arms control agreements serve little value if they do not solve every problem between the parties. This all-or-nothing approach is exemplified by the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. • We must be prepared and willing to wage, and prevail in, a “limited” nuclear war, which can remain “limited.”This mirrors an increased Russian interest in the same topic and is exemplified in the renewed U.S. program for construction The United States today has no proposals on the table for new agreements that would reduce the risk of nuclear war, other than a vague and passive call for trilateral negotiations with Beijing and Moscow. Thomas Countryman is chairman of the Board of Directors of the Arms Control Association. He served as the acting under secretary of State for arms control and international security from 2016 to 2017 and as assistant secretary of State for international security and nonproliferation from 2011 to 2017. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor in January 2017 after serving for 35 years.