The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

36 MAY 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL warheads that make first use of nuclear weapons (by either side) more credible and thus more likely. There are more potential flash points between NATO and Russian forces in Europe—and more provocative Russian behavior—that could cause an acci- dent to escalate into an incident that becomes a conventional war that escalates to a nuclear war. In an environment of aggressive cyber warfare by powers large and small, there is also a higher risk of a false alarm trigger- ing a nuclear response, an outcome we escaped with minutes to spare at several points during the Cold War. And in surveying the personality and politics of the nine men who have their fingers on nuclear buttons, there is good reason to be concerned that any of themmight put their personal ambitions ahead of the planet’s security. So what do we do? Urgent Tasks The most urgent task is renewal of the New START agreement before it expires on Feb. 5, 2021. This does not require a return to the treaty graveyard of the U.S. Senate, but only the signature of two presidents, which Putin has declared he is ready for without conditions. If no action is taken, we will have no numerical lim- its on U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear weapons for the first time in 50 years. We will also lose the notification and inspection provisions that give us insight into Russia’s nuclear capabilities. And we will touch off—gradually at first, and then rapidly— an open-ended nuclear arms race that will exceed in risk and expense what we experienced during the Cold War. It would be a race without winners, and unaffordable, as it would greatly increase the $1.7 trillion already scheduled to be spent on rebuilding and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next 30 years. (By the way, the president’s budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2021 allocates more money to the nuclear weapons enter- prise than to the entire diplomacy and development budget.) In an election year, it is to be hoped that the president will recognize that there is no other foreign policy step he can take (particularly regarding Russia) that would be welcomed by both Democrats and Republicans as much as an extension of New START. This could also kick-start a more intensive U.S.- Russian strategic stability dialogue, one that thoroughly explores the legitimate security concerns of both sides, with no topics excluded. (The three sessions of this dialogue held since 2017 have been brief, desultory encounters and have apparently not even agreed on an agenda for future work.) A New START extension would do far more than the administration’s current rhetoric in making it possible to advance the praiseworthy goals the president has advocated but done nothing to move forward: addressing both new strategic weapons and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and bringing China more fully into the nuclear risk reduction process. Beyond that, the Department of State has initiated a mul- ticountry dialogue on “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” (CEND). This is a dialogue worth having, even if it is only a less-formal talk shop than the Geneva-based U.N. Conference on Disarmament, which is an organization that makes your local Department of Motor Vehicles office seem dynamic. But the United States also has to address the skepti- cism of most CEND participants that this is intended as a means to lessen international pressure for progress on nuclear arms control action while the United States modernizes and expands its nuclear arsenal. Washington must also be willing to listen to its allies, who unanimously support New START extension, and most of whom believe it is possible to respond to the demise of the INF Treaty by means other than reprising the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s. In the longer term, it is important to rebuild the capacity of our diplomatic and military community to deal with these issues in a hardheaded way. With no genuine arms control negotiations for nearly 10 years, since conclusion of the New START treaty in 2010, we have few experts who have actually dealt with the Russians, particularly in the deliberately emaciated Department of State. Beyond the next round of negotiations, it is important that the U.S. educational system (with the support of the govern- ment) produce a new generation of experts in nuclear, Russian and Chinese affairs. Discarding a 60-year history of agreements that have improved America’s national security, saved us trillions of dollars, made it possible to invest in more effective means of defense and reduced a literally existential risk to the human race is a dangerous act of deliberate ideological blindness. In the current environment of great-power competition, there will have to be new approaches to arms control. They will not be found by rebranding “re-armament” as “arms control.” n In the longer term, it is important to rebuild the capacity of our diplomatic and military community to deal with these issues in a hardheaded way.