The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

38 MAY 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL All nuclear reductions have stopped. Nor are there any new negotiations for future reduction agreements. At best, we have vague talks about talks, or discussions of what conditions might be required before any nation could even consider reducing their nuclear stockpiles. Worse, the security architecture constructed by many nations—and in the United States by both Republicans and Democrats—is being systematically destroyed. The United States and Russia have abandoned the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) negotiated by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev—the treaty that began three decades of disarmament that reduced the global supply of nuclear weapons frommore than 66,000 to under 13,500 today. The last remaining reduction treaty, the 2010 New START agreement negotiated by Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, will expire in February 2021. The Trump administra- tion shows little interest in extending the accord. If New START dies, nuclear arsenals will be unconstrained for the first time in 50 years. Saving the Regime The collapse of disarmament efforts has provoked strong international reaction. Many non-nuclear nations have issued pleas for the few nuclear-armed states to reconsider their pro- grams and strategies. Other, more assertive actions include the construction of an alternative nuclear security architecture, one organized around a global ban on nuclear weapons, similar to the international bans on biological and chemical weapons and landmines. On July 7, 2017, 122 nations voted at the United Nations to approve a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Popu- larly known as the Ban Treaty, this agreement has since been ratified by 35 nations as of the end of February. When it enjoys ratification by 50 nations, likely before or in 2021, the agreement will become international law. The treaty is controversial. None of the nuclear-armed states have signed it, and several have come out in strong opposition. Some arms control advocates fear that it would undermine the bargain struck 50 years ago by the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): namely, that those with nuclear weapons would negotiate reductions, and those without these weapons would promise never to build them. In truth, we need both the vision and practical next steps. When the “Ban Treaty” enters into force, it will provide a noble goal, but not all the steps for achieving that goal. More will be needed to restore nuclear diplomacy. The First Step It is still possible that President Donald J. Trump could bring America back to the business of reducing the nuclear threat, even though he ended reductions and led the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the nuclear accord with Iran. After all, Ronald Reagan turned from the massive nuclear buildup of his first term to a second term where his INF Treaty broke the back of the nuclear arms race and began the 30 years of reductions we have enjoyed until the present moment. President Trump will have a chance to execute such a shift when the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council meet at the United Nations in September in a meeting convened by Russia and announced at the end of February. This meeting could allow the administration to claim progress in involving China in reduction talks and, thus, finally agree to extending the New START Treaty. Trump officials have maintained that the existing treaty is so flawed that it is only worth extending if China becomes a party to the pact and it is extended to including nonstrategic weapons, as well. Although The collapse of disarmament efforts has provoked strong international reaction. Joseph Cirincione is president of Ploughshares Fund, a foundation dedicated to eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons, and the author of Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late (2013), Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (2007) and Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (2005). He has worked on nuclear weapons policy in Washington for more than 35 years, serving previously as vice president for national security at the Center for American Progress, director for nonpro- liferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior associate at the Stimson Center. He also worked for nine years as professional staff on the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services and Government Opera- tions Committees. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Rela- tions. He also teaches at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.