The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2020 39 the administration has not done much to advance either of these goals (perhaps because they are not practically achiev- able), the September meeting could combine with domestic political pressures to convince Trump to extend the treaty. That would be a critical and popular first step. The treaty enjoys the support of U.S. military leadership because it limits Russian strategic nuclear forces and ensures compliance through robust inspections. General John Hyten, then commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified to Congress in March 2017 that he was “a big supporter” of the New START Treaty, and that “bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are essential” in providing an effective deterrence structure. Admiral Charles Richards, who now leads the Stra- tegic Command, testified on Feb. 27 that he, too, supports the treaty. Global leaders would welcome the move. “Russia has indi- cated, at the highest levels, its willingness to do so,” explained former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in a rare joint New York Times op-ed. “The United States and Russia can avoid a sense - less and dangerous return to nuclear brinksmanship if they act soon. There is no reason to wait, and extending the treaty, known as New START, is the place to begin.” They were sup- ported by a concurrent joint statement from 29 former foreign ministers who warned of a “rapidly deteriorating nuclear land- scape and the increasing possibility of nuclear weapons being used either deliberately or through an unintended escalation.” Stopping the Arms Race The second step, either by Trump or the next U.S. president, is more difficult, though no less important: We must contain the massive new nuclear weapons programs now underway before they lock in another 40 years of nuclear brinksmanship. In the United States, these programs are the legacy of the Obama administration, which agreed to an $88 billion “nuclear mod- ernization” program to secure Republican backing of the New START Treaty in 2010. There was then, and remains still, bipartisan support for the reasonable updating of older weapons and infrastructure. Presi- dent Obama himself articulated this point when he declared in Prague in 2009 that “as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal.” However, there is no bipartisan consensus for an indefinite arms race. It was assumed that reasonable modernization programs would go hand-in-hand with continued arms control. Obama and Medvedev saw New START as a quick fix to preserve