The Foreign Service Journal, May 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2020 43 air strikes to preempt North Korean nuclear facilities—assuming most are known—will risk triggering another full-blown Korean War, one potentially far more destructive than in the early 1950s, when 4 million soldiers and civilians lost their lives. Some military experts believe high-tech conventional weapons, rushed to the scene, would be sufficient to turn back an armored assault. But if South Korea appeared in danger of being overrun, would the United States resort to tactical nuclear weapons? That is hardly the vision of a New World Order that President [George H.W.] Bush had in mind in the afterglow of Desert Storm. But that is a real-world specter, which must be confronted and thought through. —William Beecher, June 1992 Almost a Success Story The transition from authoritarian to democratic structures, while having an important positive political impact, also has entailed a deterioration of control over nuclear material. … Reflecting on a half century of living with nuclear weapons, it is remarkable that despite the broad access to nuclear technology, there exist today only five declared nuclear weapon states, three nuclear-capable states and a few others whose nuclear intentions remain uncertain. Much of this can be explained by existence of a nuclear non- proliferation regime anchored on the NPT, leading states to conclude that their security interests are best served by abjur- ing nuclear weapons. —Lawrence Scheinman, February 1998 Needed: A New Nuclear Contract From the beginning of the nuclear era, the U.S. government recognized that in the arena of nuclear weapons, it has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. The United States opposed both British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower had to deal with the seductive logic of preventive war because it was clear that the Soviet Union, when it reached “atomic plenty,” would be able to inflict massive damage on the United States. Launching an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities, possibly in cahoots with the Soviet Union, was seriously discussed during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Clinton administration gave thought to an attack on North Korean nuclear facilities. Yet each American president decided against preventive war. Diplomacy, and time, eventually became the preferred tools of Washington policymakers from both parties in the effort to control proliferation. —James Goodby, July-August 2007 Focus A Nuclear Reductions Primer The significance of the START Follow- on Treaty extends beyond the bilateral military relationship between the United States and Russia. The deep reductions that it envisions and the concomi- tant commitment to seek even deeper reductions in the future also respond to international calls for demonstrated progress toward nuclear disarmament. That achievement is expected to enable the United States to lobby the international community more credibly and effectively to strengthen nonproliferation norms and hold violators of those norms accountable. —Sally K. Horn, December 2009 Focus What the Iran Nuclear Deal Says about Making Foreign Policy Today Whether driven by ideology, money or both, the debate over the Iran nuclear issue marked a new low in relations between the Republican majorities in Congress and the Obama administration. It also prompted a remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, level of involvement by groups outside of government. Think-tanks, political advocacy organizations, pro-Israel and religious groups, nonprofit associations, veterans’ groups, media outlets, arms control organizations and others weighed in on both sides of the debate. It was a foreign affairs food fight, with positions both for and against the agreement argued with great passion and intensity. —Dennis Jett, October 2017 n