The Foreign Service Journal, May 2021

28 MAY 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and reducing their reflectivity of sunlight, which in turn causes those surfaces to grow warmer. The council previously set an “aspirational goal” to reduce black carbon; now should be the time to take concrete mea- sures to meet that goal. More generally, the United States can once again become a leader in the many programs and projects that relate in some way to the warming Arctic climate. During the Trump administration, officials who repre- sented the United States in the coun- cil had some leeway to allow such work to move forward, so long as it stayed under the political radar screen. Now, with the full support of the White House, U.S. repre- sentatives to the council can press their counterparts to take bold action and bring to bear the significant expertise and resources of the United States in support of such action. The Biden administration should also consider proposals to create the position of “Arctic ambassador” or the equivalent. There is some precedent for creating such a position. During the Obama administration, Secretary of State John Kerry appointed Robert Papp, a former commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, as “Special Representative for the Arctic.” In that role, Admiral Papp oversaw preparations for, and execution of, the 2015-2017 U.S. chairman- ship of the Arctic Council. But a career civil servant continued to serve as the senior U.S. official representing our nation in the Arctic Council. More recently, Secretary Pompeo appointed James DeHart, a Foreign Service officer, as “U.S. Coordinator for the Arctic Region.” But he, too, does not represent the United States in the Arctic Council—that responsibility now rests with Meredith Rubin, an FSO. It may be time to rethink these arrangements, and raise the level of U.S. representation in the council to the ambassadorial level, a step that other Arctic Council members took years ago. The United States should also urge the other Arctic states to strengthen the council itself. Despite its remarkable evolution, the Arctic Council lacks a long-term strategic plan, adequate and predictable funding, and a consolidated secretariat. Its current structure, put into place in 1996, needs revision to enable the ARCTICCOUNCIL A ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council takes place in Iqaluit, Canada, in April 2015. The flags of the eight Arctic Council member-states and six Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations. LINNEANORDSTÖM/ARCTICCOUNCILSECRETARIAT live in almost all time zones. Despite these challenges, the government of Iceland has done a creditable job of keeping the council functioning as well as possible, making progress in several areas. Looking Ahead The Biden administration now has the chance to change the narrative within the Arctic Council. Most obviously, it can—and almost certainly will—join other member-states and permanent participants in using the council as a venue in which to combat the causes and effects of climate change. For example, the United States can contribute to renewed efforts by the group to reduce emissions of black carbon (soot) in the region. These particles settle on the Arctic’s white surfaces, turning them dark