The Foreign Service Journal, May 2021

44 MAY 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL norm. As we build an Arctic-capable military, should we not also build an Arctic-capable diplomatic corps? Needed: Arctic-Capable Diplomats The United States is one of the only Arctic countries without an Arctic ambassador—a diplomatic post that even many non- Arctic countries have. The Arctic is not represented at the assis- tant secretary of State level inside the State Department, as most global regions are, but is instead represented within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, which has done an admirable job. It was only in 2014 that we gained a “Special Representative for the Arctic,” appointed by President Barack Obama. This position was eliminated in 2017 only to be replaced by President Donald Trump in 2020 with the “Coordinator for the Arctic Region.” Estab- lishing the special representative position and then the coordina- tor position was important for America’s Arctic advocates. That good progress continued when the consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, reopened this past summer—a positive step toward expanding our diplomatic presence in and commitment to the Arctic region. To many countries outside the United States, though, those actions were emblematic of our government’s historic neglect of the region. They highlighted the slow and uncertain path of estab- lishing robust and consistent American diplomatic Arctic leader- ship. And they did little to disprove our often-wavering commit- ment and piecemeal approach. Moreover, these diplomatic moves are still overshadowed by the suggestion of securitizing the Arctic rather than seeking common ground. In 2019 I attended the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Finland, where then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suggested it was time to bring security issues into the multilateral Arctic discussion. There is merit to this suggestion, because we can- not ignore that the region is becoming increasingly militarized, regardless of what we may hope or desire. However, security issues should remain off the Arctic Council’s agenda. There are appropriate platforms to discuss Arctic defense—the Munich Security Conference’s Arctic Security Round Table being one. Bringing back the Chiefs of Arctic Defense meeting is another. It wasn’t the remark about security by our chief diplomat that stayed with me, however. Instead, it was when he felt the need to rebuke China for its assertion of being a “near-Arctic state.” Let me be perfectly clear: China is not an Arctic state, and declaring itself a near-Arctic state, as Mr. Pompeo correctly stated, “entitles them to exactly nothing.” But the very fact that our top diplomat needed to dissuade a non-Arctic country from being interested in the Arctic said less about China’s interest in the region than it did about how he viewed our own nation’s ability to diplomatically safeguard our own interests in that region. Ready or not, Arctic and non-Arctic countries are coming to the Arctic, and both Arctic and non-Arctic countries know the region’s resources play a vital role in their futures. Russian President Vladimir Putin believes upward of $30 trillion of wealth exists in the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping sees benefit from Russia’s oil and gas, fuel that is shipped from Rus- sia’s Kola Peninsula along the Northern Sea Route, through the Bering Sea, to the Chinese coast—coming to within a stone’s throw of the United States along the way. There is no question as to why the Russian military had such a large presence in the Bering Sea last summer, nor any wonder why China calls itself “near-Arctic.” Expanding America’s Arctic Leadership If we are meeting China and Russia at the negotiating table, then the Arctic—the region itself, what it represents and what it entails—is a front-and-center issue, not some far-off place. The United States must treat it that way. This means having Arctic- literate diplomats and statesmen, not just Arctic soldiers and sailors. To this end, I tirelessly advocate for establishing Arctic leadership and expect the current and subsequent administra- tions to build on what previous administrations have started. I have directly asked President Joe Biden to consider expanding America’s Arctic leadership across the executive branch, within both the State and Defense Departments, on the National Secu- rity Council and beyond. I have asked that the Arctic Executive Steering Committee be reestablished, with additional seats for Alaska Native leader- ship. I recommended that a senior adviser for the Arctic report to the president’s special envoy for climate—because one cannot craft and execute actionable climate policy without considering the Arctic, and one cannot address the broad and interrelated aspects of climate without addressing the realities of resource extraction. And I have also asked the new administration to quickly appoint the first executive director of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, a congressionally authorized It will require us to exercise serious and dedicated Arctic diplomacy—a capacity we will have to create.