The Foreign Service Journal, May 2023

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MAY 2023 49 ized the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)—the information talks brought together high-ranking Soviet officials and 67 U.S. government officials and private-sector leaders to begin a new era of communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. The past 40 years have shown the importance and complexity of U.S.-Russian relations in the area of public diplomacy. After an initial burst of freedom of information, starting in the late 1980s, today’s Russia (along with other authoritarian regimes) has again reverted to dictatorial rule, anti-Western rhetoric, and disinfor- mation campaigns. A Shaky Start Despite a general warming of U.S.-Soviet relations, reflected in the initial pleasantries exchanged by Falin and Wick, the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Information Talks got off to a shaky start. In his opening remarks, Wick immediately raised the question of Soviet disinformation, stating that it should be deplored by everyone professing a belief in glasnost (openness) and reform. “Under new thinking,” Wick noted in a declassified memcon, “how could the Soviet side knowingly approve the dissemination of such patently false and misleading stories as the alleged inven- tion of AIDS in a U.S. military laboratory, the alleged invention by the U.S. of an ethnic weapon, or the alleged U.S. responsibility for the Jonestown massacre? The continuation of patently false stories when facts are readily available poisons the relationship between our two countries, contributes to the enemy image, and robs leaders of the element of trust.” Soviet disinformation campaigns were a serious point of contention between the U.S. and the USSR, and it was proper for Wick to raise the issue forcefully. As other U.S. officials chimed in with more examples of disinformation, a heated back-and-forth discussion ensued with Soviet officials vigorously denying the charges. But as the plenary session progressed, I began to see moments of honesty. (I was there as an executive of the Board for International Broadcasting.) Leonid Dobrokhotov, head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, admitted that Soviet scientists had long ago rejected the notion that the United States invented the AIDS virus. Vadim Perfiliev, deputy chief of the Information Depart- ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conceded that there were times his department had issued “incorrect information.” Those small concessions ensured that the session ended on a positive note and that both sides were able to draw up plans for another round of information talks. The next day, Steve Forbes, chair of the Board for International Broadcasting; Bruce Porter, the board’s executive director; and I met with Valentin Falin to discuss the jamming of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. A longtime Soviet official, who had served in the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Falin greeted us in a cold and perfunctory manner. There were no pleasantries to exchange, and he seemed visibly uncomfortable sitting down with three representatives of RFE/RL, acting as though he had been sent to deliver a message he did not agree with. His first words caught us by surprise. “We have noticed,” he said, taking a long pause, “a distinct improvement in the broadcasts of Radio Liberty.” What followed those important words was the usual litany of RL sins: unfair criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan, lack of respect for the democratization of Soviet society, and the encouragement of nationalism in the Soviet republics. As I listened to Falin’s criticism, all standard Soviet fare, I felt he was simply going through the motions, reading from a list pre- pared by his staff. He knew the decision to stop jamming RL had already been made, and he was just the messenger. The world that he and his colleagues had strived to build was crumbling before his eyes. Radio Liberty—vilified for decades, emblematic of a non-communist Russia—was now being treated in Moscow with respect as an important international broadcaster. How awkward that meeting must have been for him, a lifelong party apparatchik and a diehard opponent of glasnost. We dutifully noted his criticism, politely stood our ground regarding specific broadcasts, and reminded Falin that jamming was a violation of international law and contradicted the spirit of Gorbachev’s reforms. Falin did not respond, and the meet- ing ended abruptly. But as we walked out, we all had a sense of jubilation. Just by sitting down with us, Falin communicated that it was only a matter of time before jamming would cease. Know- ing that the Soviet authorities had recently approved a VOA news Faced with an aggressive Stalin regime in the late 1940s, the U.S. undertook a comprehensive strategic review of the tools, methods, and institutions needed to successfully wage a ColdWar.