The Foreign Service Journal, June 2004

anti-Americanism. Public pronounce- ments and media coverage left no ambiguity on the subject. Ratsiraka, a self-proclaimed Marxist, admired North Korea’s Kim Il Sung and count- ed as his allies the Soviet Union, East Germany, Cuba and Libya. Mada- gascar was one of the few countries voting at the U.N. in favor of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. I was the chargé d’affaires and, as a keen tennis player, I made friends with several tennis buffs among President Ratsiraka’s more moderate advisers. Both the president and I exchanged views and information through these individuals, minimizing the need for face-to-face contact where Ratsiraka might have become defensive. Gradually he came to real- ize, through our persistent personal diplomacy, that we were not working at odds with his regime. With Ambassador Fred Rondon in Washington, I led the first bilateral negotiations (PL-480, Title I) with the socialist regime as my initial task in the country. The Reagan White House and the Malagasy leadership fully expected the negotiations to break down, though for different rea- sons. Our team remained steadfast, however, determined to see an agree- ment come to fruition. An agreement was achieved through a lot of tweak- ing and resulted in unexpected favor- able publicity for the U.S. Natural disasters, such as a series of five cyclones, subsequently gave us an opportunity to build upon this ini- tial gesture of good will by providing economic and humanitarian assis- tance. As we worked to assist Madagascar in recognizing its self- inflicted economic problems, Ratsiraka remained obstinate, but his resistance gradually wore down. The keys to American efforts in turning his pro-Soviet regime to a more acceptable nonaligned policy were several. The constancy of the message delivered in a non-provoca- tive manner to the Malagasy govern- ment by the U.S. embassy along with our Western allies and neutral col- leagues was a major factor. The great support that we received from USAID’s Regional Economic Devel- opment Support Offices in Kenya and backup in Washington provided the embassy with the means to demon- strate our good intentions. President Ratsiraka’s position on the U.S. softened to the point of acceptance of a greater American role in his country. This led to initiating a self-help program, inviting a Peace Corps contingent, establishing a USAID mission and close ties to American and French military train- ing programs. Such activities were impossible to achieve in the political J U N E 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 61