The Foreign Service Journal, June 2004

a “strange resemblance to the defunct League of Nations” — has only undermined once-solid West- ern goals, as evidenced in the Iraqi War run-up. The question is not who is right — for neither side is, really — but what both sides can and should do to ward off a permanent estrangement, according to the author. Europe must learn to speak with a single voice on foreign policy issues, if it hopes to become an equal partner in world matters, or watch its strategic weakness spiral into virtual irrele- vance. “In its own interests, even more than in the interests of its rela- tionship with the United States, the European Union must therefore add to its multilateralist culture ... a gen- uine strategic dimension,” Cohen- Tanugi writes. To exert real influ- ence on the United States, Europe must strengthen the transatlantic alliance and its own credibility by assuming a “more significant portion of the financial and military burdens of international security.” In other words, stop complaining and step up, cash and troops in hand. What can America do for its part? Meet Europe halfway by re-empha- sizing credible diplomacy and re- assuming its role as the international community’s leader, not just global policeman. In short, Cohen-Tanugi declares, the United States must “redefine its attitude to the develop- ing world, and to the major global issues,” encouraging Arab democra- tization and integration into the world economy. While hardly light summer read- ing, both volumes are well worth the effort. Benjamin R. Justesen, a former Foreign Service officer, is the author of George Henry White: An Even Chance in the Race of Life (Louisiana State Press, 2001). What Diplomacy Can Do Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025 Ambassador Mark Palmer, Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, $27.95, hard- cover, 321 pages. R EVIEWED BY E LIZABETH S PIRO C LARK The real “axis of evil” in the world, according to Mark Palmer, is its 45 remaining dictators. In Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025 , he calls on the U.S. to make the goal of getting rid of them a core objective of its foreign policy. To make his case, the former ambassador to Hungary takes on two pillars of conventional wisdom: that it is naive to think we can impose democracy on other countries, and that U.S. interests require working with dictators to guarantee stability. Palmer rejects both claims, making a strong case that dictatorships are never in the U.S. interest. Far from guaranteeing stability, they harbor and support terrorists, criminals and each other. Furthermore, “our moral interest in democracy coin- cides completely with our interest in security and prosperity … the world is really not divided between cul- tures, religions and economies but between democrats and dictators.” Even where the U.S. must work with strongmen, diplomats can and should also support internal democ- ratic movements. The most engrossing sections of the book are detailed accounts of the key roles diplomats Michael Arma- cost and Harry Barnes played in bringing democracy to the Phili- ppines and Chile, respectively. Armacost’s decision to attend the funeral of assassinated Filipino opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in 1983 kicked off a long diplomatic chess game to put Washington on the side of the demo- cratic movement his murder ener- gized. In Chile, Barnes played a key role, also at many junctures, in the 1988 plebiscite that led to Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s ouster. And in very different circumstances, Amb. Smith Hempstone in Kenya and Palmer himself in Hungary demon- strated how embassies (and groups of embassies) can become what the author calls “Freedom Houses,” pushing or nudging dynamic politi- cal situations to favor democracy. Intriguingly, Palmer outlines what a nonviolent strategy for removing Saddam Hussein after the first Persian Gulf War might have looked like. Its centerpiece would have been an internationally recognized “Trans- itional Council” in the north and, ulti- mately, internationally supported strikes and mass demonstrations that would force Saddam’s removal. Given what we now know of Saddam’s slide into non-functionality, the case that this strategy would have been success- ful is plausible. Palmer’s emphasis on targeting the dictators as individuals has pluses and minuses. He keeps the focus on over- coming the main obstacles to democ- ratization (i.e., those in power) and avoids getting bogged down in deter- mining what the “preconditions” for democracy are. But there is some artificiality in his “least-wanted 45” list (for example, China’s non-democracy is not really a dictatorship). And Palmer’s focus on individuals keeps him from taking up tricky issues of national and cultural pride. Still, there is no disputing Palmer’s central point that, as in the period immediately following World War II, the world needs “new structures to 66 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 4 B O O K S