The Foreign Service Journal, June 2005

cial reform, and a trade policy that is more ambitious and targeted to meet the needs of the “have-nots.” The second global trend is the cri- sis of governance. The geography of the “have-nots” overlaps closely with the regions where governance is either authoritarian, weak, unstable, brittle or non-existent. This gover- nance problem was masked by the ColdWar, but is now exposed in coun- tries ranging from Indonesia, where the feeble light of elections flickers but civil society remains fragile, through Pakistan, where poor gover- nance poses a serious regional (and perhaps global) security challenge, to the Middle East, where autocratic governance clearly conceals high risks of social and political instability. Moreover, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the governance crisis prevails in an even broader part of the world. The current prescription for addressing poor governance, and the only positive security message the U.S. has provided in the last four years, is to promote democracy. Democracy is unquestionably a “good thing,” though we may not like the results of democratic elections, whether in Iraq or elsewhere. Helping countries develop governments that are at least minimally representative and respon- sive, have effective control over their territory, and can deliver for their peo- ple is essential in order to pave the way for meaningful solutions to multi- ple social and economic crises. It is also needed to stem the tide of such transnational threats as mass migra- tions, trade in narcotics, human traf- ficking and international crime. (Conversely, its absence reinforces the problem of global inequality.) But democracy promotion alone is an inad- equate and even dangerous answer to our security problems. Achieving democracy is a long-term and uncer- tain process. Moreover, democracy, installed from the outside and with no attention to economic inequality or ethnic and religious hatred, risks becoming tyranny. Democracy pro- motion will not address our larger security agenda, as will be discussed below. The third trend sweeping through many of the same nations can be called “tribalism,” a surge of ethnic and religious hatred unleashed by the end of the Cold War that has become one of the most powerful forces rein- forcing conflict around the world. Contrary to the optimistic predictions of a decade ago, history has not “ended,” but has become inflamed. While tribalism is linked to inequality and weak or brittle gover- nance, it is also identifiably separate. Conflicts of belief do not always fit with a realist approach, or with a focus on economic stress. The “clash” of Islam and Christianity is only one manifestation; Kashmir has a different version, as do the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Balkans. Collectively, these three trends constitute the underlying threat to our national security and to global stability. They operate in synergy, a witches’ brew that national security policy- makers around the globe will face for decades. Only by recognizing these trends and creating a hope for greater equality, effective governance and an end to tribal warfarewill the U.S. and the international community be able to truly come to grips with the symp- tomatic dilemmas of terror and prolif- eration. Towardan Integrated Strategy The U.S. needs an integrated, global and hopeful vision of national security, one that focuses on the long term and on overcoming these trends. The current candidate for such a uni- fying vision is democracy promotion. But while attractive, the promotion of democracy will not address these underlying trends and could make them even more dangerous. First of all, democracy is not a recipe for end- ing the inequality that results from a globalized economy and failed gover- nance. It is also a very far-off result of very complex processes, which include the emergence of an economic middle class, more effective governance and a reduction in tribalism. Promoting democracy without addressing poverty, government failure and tribalism only delivers these stresses into a system of governance that cannot resolve them. This, in turn, leads to the kind of rollbacks we have seen in Russia, where economic setbacks have led to a sustained cen- tralization of power and a sharp decline in democracy. Letting coun- tries “eat democracy” exposes them to the risk of tyranny, if these underlying issues are not addressed. The Bush administration has been swift to hail the January legisla- tive elections in Iraq as vindication of its strategy. Yet democratization was a post-hoc rationale for a policy whose main pillar, Saddam Huss- ein’s weapons of mass destruction, had collapsed. Moreover, elections took place there not because the U.S. encouraged them, but because leading Shiites insisted on them despite the objections of a substan- tial, irredentist minority that sustains the insurgency. 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 5 The U.S. needs an integrated, global and hopeful vision of national security, one that focuses on the long term.