The Foreign Service Journal, June 2005

the agenda of global inequities. Our intelligence tool has been especially poorly used. Nearly all the preparations for the 9/11 terrorist attacks were missed by the intelli- gence community, and policy-makers ignored the few warnings that came to them. What “truth-telling” intelli- gence agencies may have wanted to communicate about Iraq was lost in the fog of the intention to go to war and preconceived notions about the basis for that war, and superseded by flawed, biased data that came from outside channels, such as the Iraqi National Congress. As former Rep. Lee Hamilton, co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, has observed, the intelli- gence community may always have provided the intelligence the presi- dent wanted, but it does not seem to have given him what he needed. Of course, there is reason to speculate that this was because he did not want to hear information that contradicted his beliefs — a sign the intelligence tool was poorly integrated into the strategy. Yet the agenda of fundamental issues we face demands, more than ever before, good intelligence that can be integrated into our national securi- ty strategy. Shuffling the boxes on the organizational chart, however well- intentioned, will not ensure that poli- cy-makers obtain such intelligence, and may prove to be a bureaucratic distraction. Intelligence needs to go looking in some dark places to be use- ful; it will not do to look under the lamppost for the keys simply because the light is better there. Public diplomacy is another critical tool. We have had a lot of public rela- tions efforts, but precious little public diplomacy. The PR campaigns we have waged in the Middle East, whether by radio or television, have not been well-received in the region; they may even have backfired when inconsistent with our policy. Further- more, it is not enough to throw money at the problem: public diplomacymust reflect understanding and empathy for the regions and populations we wish to reach. Finally, we have the military tool, especially large in size and budget under the current administration. Vital as it is, armed might is still a sup- port function in the national security toolkit. Or to put it another way, it is often the horse on which effective diplomacy rides, but it cannot and should not be the lead horse on the team. As we have seen in Iraq, our overstressed military is willing to do whatever policy-makers ask of them, and to devise inventive responses to get the job done; but the armed forces a re simply not well-suited to the task of nation-building— leading efforts to p romote effective governance and economic development. We run the risk of damaging this essential instru- ment by over-relying on it and using it inappropriately. Even with a complete set of inte- grated tools, the United States cannot tackle these underlying security issues alone. Virtual unilateralism must end; it is counterproductive to achieving our national security goals. Economic inequality, brittle or anarchic gover- nance and tribal strife cannot be addressed in a “my way or the high- way” manner. This is not an argument about permission slips or global tests; it is about the underlying problems and how they can be effectively addressed. That means persuading others of the wisdom of our vision. Only then can we enlist the participation and cooperation of a very wide array of actors — allies, international organiza- tions and governments, even those wary of us — in support of tackling these underlying problems. It also means accepting the fact that we have squandered an extraordinary amount of good will in the world over the past four years, which will not be easily rebuilt. The Need for Self-Awareness The United States has acted in and on the world for more than two cen- turies. It has done so not as an excep- tional nation, unlike any other, nor the “indispensable nation” once champi- oned by Secretary of State Albright, let alone a benign hegemon. The sooner we get over these notions, the easier it will be to tackle the broad agenda, integrate the tools, and win the sup- port and trust of others. We are the most militarily powerful country in the world and have a histo- ry of interaction, involvement, sup- port, invasion, intrusion and coopera- tion — a web of experience that links us to the rest of the world. We are , and have often been, the elephant of which the ants are wary, sometimes doing good and sometimes not, but always pursuing what we see as our interests. And while we are a great democracy, our democratic process is sometimes flawed and far from the only example for the world to follow. Throughout our history, Americans have been eager to pat ourselves on the back for being the “good guy” who always acts selflessly, with the best interests of everybody else in mind. We rarely see ourselves the way others see us, understanding that what we do and have done in the past has had an impact on their lives, on how they view security, and on how they view us. So 64 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 5 How the U.S. uses its position as the sole superpower shapes how the rest of the world regards us.