The Foreign Service Journal, June 2006

challenge of dealing with governance failure in developing countries that have become magnets for terrorist net- works, criminal gangs, illegal arms trade, narcotics cartels, money laundering and counterfeiting rings. Three such states — Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan — served as hosts for Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network during the 1990s. Addressing Failed States Fragile and failed states also represent one of the greatest development challenges of our time. Two billion of the poorest, most undernourished, and sickest people in the world live in about 50 fragile or failing states. Fortunately, in responding to this challenge we now have a truly historic confluence of vital national interest, rigorous development analysis and great moral purpose. In fact, not since the Marshall Plan of nearly 60 years ago have we witnessed such a clear alignment of these tradi- tionally conflicting interests in our aid program. Over the past five years, USAID has sought simulta- neously to realign its organizational structure, budgeting and personnel systems, and programming to address state fragility and failure. For instance, we have created a new career track (called a “backstop,” equivalent to a “cone” in the State Department) within the Foreign Service personnel system called crisis, stabilization and governance, which 10 percent of the agency’s officers have now joined. This cadre is now being trained in com- mon doctrine, programming design and operating sys- tems to carry out these new strategies. Four years ago we created the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management to create new program instruments and analytical tools to deal with conflict, a major factor in state fragility and failure. Officers from CMM have been assigned to State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to do joint planning. USAID has also established an Office of Military Affairs to better coordinate its crisis response planning with counterparts in the regional commands. This enhanced focus on conflict and fragility is reflect- ed in a USAID program on the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. The Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program is designed to assist former combatants of the Moro National Liberation Front make the transition from guerrillas to commercial farmers and fishermen. Since 1997, LEAP has provided over 24,000 former MNLF combatants with technical assistance and train- ing, agricultural and aquaculture production inputs, and post-harvest equipment and support facilities. In order to assist in bringing about greater trust between the Philippine government and the former combatants, LEAP uses local government offices to deliver services. I recently came across a poignant endorsement of this program’s efforts in a letter from an Islamic insurgent commander in Mindanao to former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Frank Riccardone, a good friend of mine and one of our most able diplomats. It says: “If LEAP- USAID was in Mindanao 30 years ago, war did not hap- pen in Mindanao” (sic). The commander asked the ambassador for a similar program to be extended to his area. Riccardone responded that they would have to lay down their arms first; then we would talk about a recon- struction program for them. USAID’s internal realignment will assist our friends in the developing world to escape the failed-state trap. One African head of state turned to me at an international conference and remarked, “As a nation, America can no longer afford to have its friends fail in the development process.” I would put it more positively: it is in America’s national interest for our friends to succeed in the devel- opment process. That mandate calls for a better align- ment of American diplomatic, trade, military and devel- opment resources to facilitate their efforts to reduce poverty through sustained economic growth; build com- petent, well-governed democracies; and provide reliable public services. A new communications strategy is being implemented to parallel the State Department’s own enhanced public diplomacy campaign. All USAID missions are hiring development information officers to work alongside the political section in embassies to explain USAID programs to the public. For instance, a new branding campaign for all USAID field programs uses the traditional handshake logo, which goes back to the Marshall Plan, but combines it with a new tag line — “USAID from the American People” — in red, white and blue. In strategically important regions such as the Islamic world, USAID missions are carrying out public service campaigns on local radio and television to advertise pro- grams. We now have ample polling data to conclude that the branding and communications plans are substantially increasing public awareness of these programs. In the West Bank and Gaza, awareness of the USAID programs among the Palestinian people went from 5 to 55 percent F O C U S J U N E 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 21