The Foreign Service Journal, June 2006

60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 6 A Success Story Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross- National Quantitative Study Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Perez-Linan and Mitchell A. Seligson, USAID (www.usaid.gov), 20 06, 116 pages. R EVIEWED BY T ED C RAIG With democracy promotion elevat- ed to unprecedented importance in U.S. foreign policy, the question of whether tangible assistance can make a difference has become urgent. After more than 15 years of experi- ence in the field by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department and affiliated NGOs, an answer remains elusive despite the best efforts of practition- ers, academics and auditors. This should not surprise anyone; after all, democracy, like economic development, is a broad goal. It is not easy to know when you have achieved it, or how much of it you’ve secured. And even where you can see progress, it is nearly impossible to say what brought it about. At a minimum, it is almost always more plausible to give credit to local actors and circum- stances than to the modest assistance program of an outside donor. USAID deserves praise for funding and supporting a detailed and complex assessment of these efforts: Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study. Skeptics may balk when a government-funded study demonstrates the effectiveness of a government program, but this peer- reviewed report by three prominent researchers — Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Perez-Linan and Mitchell A. Seligson — withstands scrutiny. The authors, affiliated with the University of Virginia, University of Pittsburgh and Vanderbilt University, respectively, utilized over 50 indica- tors — including some very specific ones like “favorable conditions for the nonprofit sector” or “rights in judicial proceedings for minorities” — but relied on two comprehensive mea- sures (Freedom House and Polity IV) of democratization. They then looked at trends in 165 sovereign developing countries (plus Palestine), 121 of which received some U.S. democracy and governance aid between 1990 and 2003. Next, they used growth models and other tools to isolate the impact of our democracy and governance assis- tance from other commonly cited fac- tors that may strengthen or under- mine a developing democracy, such as economic performance, inequalities and ethnic division. They found that an investment of $10 million per year in DG assistance in an average country will produce a fivefold acceleration in democratic progress. On the FreedomHouse 13- point scale of political rights and civil liberties, this translates into a gain of 0.25 points a year. However, general development assistance did not pro- duce discernible democratic progress. Only three other variables proved to have a significant impact on democ- racy: 1) economic growth; 2) the spill- over effects from being in a democra- tizing region; and 3) political and social conflict or violence. Still, the authors conclude that the greatest variations in democratic per- formance cannot be attributed to any of the studied variables, including DG programs. Instead, they suggest that democratic development is influ- enced significantly by “contingent choices made by social and political elites (as well as by citizens) in con- texts of high uncertainty.” More pro- saically, leadership, interest groups, and popular movements matter. And so too, then, could diplomacy. In an era where weak or incapable governments are vulnerable to trans- national terrorism, global trafficking and ethnic chauvinism, some have suggested that we have undervalued order and authority in our rush to democratize. The counter-argument is that only democracies can offer legitimate and stable government for the long term. From either perspec- tive, it matters greatly whether donors help fragile democracies get stronger. This study appears to show we can. It bears emphasizing that the study B OOKS The U.S. must help fragile democracies get stronger. This study appears to show we can. u