The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

diminish the attraction and influence of madrassas (Islamic religious schools) within the country and in Pakistan. The U.S. military understands the strategic importance of this program and strongly supports it; but USAID is wary of the religious content of the “model schools” (reduced greatly from the madrassa curriculum, but still pre- sent), citing the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This reluc- tance has caused major frustration on the part of both the military and the Afghan government. While the March FSJ articles suc- ceed in portraying the first-hand experiences of FSOs working in PRTs, they are not complemented by other descriptions of where and how the Foreign Service interacts with the military. I’m referring to the work of the political advisers and develop- ment advisers in regional commands and headquarters (in the case of Afghanistan, now NATO/ISAF); the role of the civ-mil offices in both embassies and USAID missions; and, finally, the considerable time and effort spent by embassy and USAID mission front offices on military inter- action. We even have USAID per- sonnel operating in the field with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (i.e, the Special Forces). Perhaps our most successful partner- ship with the military is found in southern Afghanistan, where an ISAF regional command has dedicated por- tions of a British-led task force to secure a zone around a major infra- structure project, allowing recon- struction to proceed. In addition, USAID/Afghanistan has established a unique chief-of-staff position in the office of the mission director dedicated to civil-military affairs and oversight of the PRT pro- gram. This is a “grey hair” position; the current incumbent has 30 years of experience with USAID and can “talk the talk” with the military brass. (His predecessor had been a naval officer before joining the agency.) In addi- tion, we seek out military veterans, ideally with subsequent USAID or State experience, for these positions. Our incoming PRT deputy director is a Vietnam vet with nearly 20 years of USAID experience, most recently in conflict zones such as Nepal and Colombia. Both State and USAID need to institutionalize this type of recruitment. For similar staffing rec- ommendations, see the U.S. Institute of Peace’s recent special report: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq” (www.usip.org ). Over the past several years, the U.S. has made a number of efforts to improve the civilian-military partner- ship, largely through training at venues such as the National Defense University, the Army War College and U.S. Army facilities like Fort Bragg, as well as NATO military bases in Europe. Curricula are being revised, and even more training programs are in development. While not explicitly linked to the partnership, S/CRS is also involved in this effort. It is, for example, current- ly building an interagency manage- ment system with broad participation that will define and shape civ-mil operational models. In addition, USAID has created the Office of Military Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humani- tarian Affairs. USAID FSOs have been placed in the regional com- mands, and military officers are being assigned to OMA as well as S/CRS. These are all steps in the right direction, but are they enough with- out more fundamental changes? The Way Ahead In closing, let me offer some spe- cific recommendations for the admin- istration and Congress: Increase the number of FSOs in countries like Afghanistan with huge military contingents. USAID/Afghan- istan has just one development advis- er based at NATO/ISAF headquar- ters, which is clearly insufficient. Deploy more senior FSOs to civ- mil positions with significant partner- ship opportunities. Most USAID pro- gram officers in Afghanistan are Personal Services Contractors, and are on the young side with little or no time in USAID (much less military experience). Despite skill and dedica- tion, they are generally not the best partners for the military. Encourage flexibility and a willing- ness to take risks within the culture of the Foreign Service. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives both work well with the military and are highly respected by them, precise- ly because they respond quickly and decisively to crises. However, their mandates are limited to particular events and periods. Clarify the respective lines of oper- ational responsibility among DOD, State and USAID to ensure their efforts are “coordinated and primarily focused on development outcomes,” as recommended in the OECD report cited earlier. This is perhaps a respon- sibility that should be given to President Bush’s new “war czar,” Lt. General Douglas Lute. Rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act to reflect current realities. The world has changed dramatically since the 18 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 7 S P E A K I N G O U T Efforts are under way to improve the civilian- military partnership, largely through training.