The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

offenses, the court of public opinion concurrently gave the defendants the honor of being icons of reform and democracy. Iranian society is evolving rapid- ly. Unctuous sophistry, hidebound slogans and superficial palliatives are now met with cynicism and tongue-in-cheek ridicule; emotional and frenzied crowds are giving way to calm and organized opponents; family structure is becoming more egalitarian; personal relationships and expectations are better defined; and both the con- sumers and purveyors of goods and services are becoming better informed. Furthermore, the commercialization of the electoral space, the financing of political life by busi- nesses, elite factionalism, and the entry of new con- stituencies (such as families of the martyrs, Hezbollah activists and war veterans) into the political fray are alter- ing the political landscape. In short, the process of the transition from a traditional-authoritarian society to a more modern-open one continues despite the various set- backs. The weight of the demographic tidal wave, coupled with the accumulation of people’s unmet socio-economic needs and political expectations (e.g., free speech and assembly, free elections, a fair judicial system), which gave birth to the reformist movement, are hard to ignore. Yet despite the demographic trends that predominantly favor the reformists, prudence dictates that we should not con- fuse hope with reality. We should be wary of formulations that reduce politics to mere reflections of economic processes and social structures. Iran is still a country where the conduct of politics remains nontransparent, where tutelary patronage is a long-established tradition, where elites define interests largely as individual needs and private ends, where politi- cians are viewed with cynicism, where deliberate political provocations are often effective, where the precipice of mediocrity is hard to ignore, and where “free and fair elec- tions” is not synonymous with “democratic governance.” It is still a country of persons, not laws, where the reli- gious-patriarchal state is both able and willing to devour institutions of civil society, and where nongovernmental organizations cannot act as ombudsmen between civil society and the state. In addition, primordial ties often overshadow social obliga- tions. Trust as a factor of social cap- ital barely manages to cut across the horizontal family, clan and friendship ties. Social mobility is viewed as based on fortuitous fac- tors, connections or influence-ped- dling rather than hard work. And civil society remains underdevel- oped, its shock-absorbing institu- tions fragile. Pendulum Swings In Iranian politics, observed trends and regime posi- tions are never absolute. Flexibility toward change is the norm. The popular reform movement that appeared on the Iranian political radar screen on May 23, 1997, exposed the fallacy of the argument that we cannot trans- form a bona fide theocracy from within. On that momen- tous day — without having been cajoled by any leader or established political party — over 83 percent of eligible voters voted in the largest-ever turnout for any executive or legislative branch election and provided the reform candidate, Mohammad Khatami, with a landslide victory. In three subsequent elections — the 1999 village and city council elections, the 2000 parliamentary elections, and the 2001 presidential elections in which Khatami was once again a candidate — a respective 64 percent, 69 per- cent and 67 percent of Iran’s voters went to the polling booths and each time overwhelmingly cast their votes for the reformist candidates. Conversely, political fortune smiled on the conserva- tives in the 2003 and 2006 city and village council elec- tions, the 2004 parliamentary elections and the 2005 pres- idential elections. On these occasions the Iranian public registered their disillusionment with the status quo by electing conservative candidates who were largely politi- cally unknown. The crushing electoral defeat of the reformist camp can be partly attributed to their failure to mobilize the mushrooming constituency of the urban poor, a group not as preoccupied with the cultural sensitivities of the edu- cated elite, but experiencing the burdens of corruption, unemployment and inflation. These elections also showed that we should not underestimate the power of the conservative establishment or the enduring appeal of F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 7 Optimists argue that the demography of a young, urban, well-educated and politically aware population favors the reform movement.