The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

observer of American-Iranian rela- tions. “Both countries are prone to a moralistic air of self-righteous- ness, especially in foreign policy matters; and both are in- clined to ideological rigidity and a sense of moral superiority. Each perceives itself as the indispens- able state. Above all, these are two interpenetrated societies whose mutual sense of grievance, humili- ation and betrayal has infiltrated their respective internal politics until the line between foreign and domestic poli- cies is often indistinguishable.” Domestic Iranian politics plays a significant role in how elites frame and implement policies vis-à-vis the United States. How the political elite make use of the image of the United States reflects the vagaries of factional politics in Iran. In the absence of legitimate and effective politi- cal parties, factions employ multiple conventional and unorthodox means to undermine rivals and achieve their policy objectives. For example, factionalism is reflected in the media. The hard-line outlets consistently urge the citizenry to remain steadfast against the “Great Satan” and portray the United States, depending on the mood of the day, as a “paper tiger,” an “imploding power,” a “reckless bully,” a “hypocrite” or “the world’s leading arrogant power.” The reformist press, by contrast, continually reminds the hard- liners that the only way to thwart potential threats from the United States is to open up the Iranian political system and thereby enhance its legitimacy. This stance should be understood in light of the reformists’ weaker position within the political establish- ment. Although the reformists do not consider the United States their sworn enemy, they dangle the possi- bility of an American threat to create greater elbow room for themselves. The operating assumption is that whichever party manages to restore relations with the United States will stay in power in perpetuity and enjoy popular support. As such, those groups that are the underdog at any given moment will do their best to torpedo the other side’s efforts at any type of rapprochement. Spoiling the efforts of one’s rivals, which can also include members of one’s own faction, can take place in the form of managed leaks (i.e., revealing the 1985-1986 Iran-Contra affair), public criticism, intimidating American tourists and business people who are visiting Iran as guests of the government, etc. So the squab- bling conservatives and reformists will continue to work against each other for the foreseeable future, so long as rapprochement remains out of reach. The mainstream public and elite’s views of the United States are first and foremost driven by what America represents: the world’s largest economy, the strongest military, the most cutting-edge technology and a hegemonic entertain- ment culture. These realities are hardly lost on anyone. Yet for most Iranians, these qualities do not translate into naively believing that what is good for America is good for them. Indeed, they are reluctant to attribute any altruis- tic motives to American actions toward their own country or any other. Complaints about American unilateralism, militarism, lack of humility, inadequate knowledge of Muslim cultures, and shallow public relations campaigns are shared by people and elites across the political spec- trum. Moreover, the words and actions of Washington echo loudly in Iranian society. President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” speech in January 2002 deeply offended all those Iranians who had empathized with Americans after the 9/11 attacks and were now perplexed and angered by this designation. Meanwhile, the conservatives managed to ably exploit this “nefarious label” to their advantage in domestic politics. Furthermore, although Iranians are rather critical of the clerics’ style of statecraft and their political track record (human rights abuses, economic hardships, politi- cal violence, etc.), they resist the historical proclivity of their predecessors to call for the revolutionary overthrow of any government of which they disapproved. Some con- tend that the legacy of two revolutions (1905 and 1979) and numerous other political upheavals (1941, 1946, 1953 and 1964) in one century has diminished Iranians’ appetite for radical and drastic change. Still, at a time when the nuclear cleavage has obscured more meaningful approaches to U.S.-Iranian relations, one is left wondering whether there is, in fact, any desire in Washington or Tehran to escape the present quandary. n F O C U S J U N E 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 31 We should be wary of formulations that reduce politics to mere reflections of economic processes and social structures.