The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

claim that Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government “clearly believe” that “the cosmic struggle at the end of time…ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil” has begun. Are the Mullahs Crazy? Because accepting these no- tions would lead almost invariably to a war with Iran, such claims deserve deep scrutiny. Hawkish commentators seize upon Pres. Ahmadinejad’s bizarre and repre- hensible statements about the Holocaust, and the Iranian gov- ernment’s stated desire to “wipe Israel off the map.” Although the comments have gained new currency in the context of the nuclear dispute, it is important to rec- ognize that such rhetoric has been a part of Iranian boil- erplate for years. Similar statements have been uttered by a broad swath of political figures, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president While not particularly reassuring in itself, this consis- tency does demonstrate that there has not been a notice- able shift in policy in Tehran that has thrown the levers of power to a madman who acts outside the standard (admit- tedly poisonous) political rhetoric. Moreover, many knowl- edgeable commentators, including Kenneth Pollack, Jud- ith Yaphe and Charles Lutes of the National Defense University, have argued that there is no reason to believe that Iran’s leadership would take the suicidal step of initi- ating a nuclear war. Reuven Pedatzur, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University and Israeli Air Force veteran, puts it bluntly: “Past experience shows that the radical Iranian regime, headed by the most extreme of them all, Ayatollah Khomeini, behaved with absolute rationality at the moment of truth.” Iran’s record during the Iran-Iraq War, for example, shows that the clerical leadership is sensitive to costs, but will press for advantage where it can. Tehran’s rhetoric was uncompromising initially, but once it became clear that the country was in danger of losing outright, its lead- ership sued for peace. In the words of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, he was forced to accept the advice of “all the high-ranking political and military experts” in Iran, who had apparently told him that the prospect of victory was at least five years away and that Iran would be fighting a defensive war and attempting to rebuild its forces over the entire five years. This shift in policy would seem to reflect a fundamental rationality. Further, it is hard to believe that Israel or the United States would wait for a court-of-law degree of certitude after absorb- ing a nuclear attack to retaliate against the most likely country of origin: Iran. Nor would the trans- fer of weapons out of control of the Tehran government to a non-state group be viewed as anything less than an act of war by the United States. Either development would bring an immediate end to the ruling regime. Although no one can prove a negative, in the case of Iran there is little evidence that the clerical regime would bring about its own immolation in pursuit of ideological or religious goals. The Regional Response Another major concern is the potential response of other states in the region. Iran would likely feel emboldened by its acquisition of a nuclear weapon, and could make a play for regional hegemony. That, in turn, could cause neighboring countries to seek nuclear deterrents of their own, or to bolster their own mili- taries generally in an attempt to deter the Iranians from any mischief. This concern is probably legitimate, but overstated. Those who fear the prospect of an arms race in the Middle East argue that it would increase the likelihood of war. But, in fact, war becomes more likely if neighboring states do not arm themselves. If neighboring states main- tain their current, insufficient military efforts, and allow Iran to build power based on its nuclear capability, that would increase the likelihood of war by lowering the per- ceived cost to Iran of provoking conflict. As it happens, there is evidence that neighboring states do recognize the threat of a nuclear Iran and are beginning to consider appropriate countermeasures. At the IDEX 2007 arms trade fair in February, Arab countries went on a buying spree, spending billions of F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 7 While a nuclear capability would take unprovoked regime change off the table, it would not give Iran carte blanche to act as it pleases with respect to all of its foreign policy goals.