The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

ambition to spread its Shia political version of Islamic fun- damentalism abroad has been blunted. This setback derives from several factors: • Iran’s experience in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, when Arab Shias fought for Iraq, not Shia Iran; • The imperviousness of Sunni Muslim movements around the Arab world to Iranian leadership; • The fact that Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, adopted a more pragmatic view before he died; and (perhaps most important of all), • The reality that most Iranians, particularly the younger generation, display little enthusiasm for funda- mentalist crusades. Indeed, most observers agree that the younger generation is in the process of moderating, if not actually seeking to dismantle, the more extreme aspects of Iranian leadership. On the other hand, the patriotism Iranians demon- strated in the 1980s is very much alive. So are national and religious pride. The election of Pres. Ahmadinejad over a more pragmatic opponent (who was quietly assist- ed by some members of the religious establishment) is sometimes seen as a resurgence of fundamentalist Iranian aggressiveness. More likely, it stems from the dominant religious establishment’s fear of being ousted by a combi- nation of domestic opposition and external pressure. Within that context, Ahmadinejad’s taunting of Israel and America, and Iran’s fervent efforts to win or buy friends in the Arab world— such as the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon or Sunni Hamas in Palestine — should be seen as more defensive than aggressive. After all, Iran has no discernible claims to foreign territory (ever since the late shah dropped his claims to Bahrain). Nor is it currently fomenting terrorism in the West (where the widespread diaspora of Iranians opposed to the present regime con- stitutes a strong counterterrorist intelligence asset). In addition, Iran must view itself as in need of maxi- mum protection in a region populated by a majority of Sunni Arabs. This is brought home by al-Qaida’s aggres- sive Salafist Sunni extremism, and by secular Sunni Arab governments (with the exception of Syria, whose minority F O C U S J U N E 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 43