The Foreign Service Journal, June 2007

Alawite Shia leadership is still hanging on in a Sunni-majority state). These are supported by a U.S.-led coalition that includes Britain, one of Iran’s historical bogeymen. True, there are currently no strong Sunni Arab armies that could threaten Iranian sovereignty. But in Iranian eyes the American threat cannot be overlooked, so Tehran must do what it can to pro- duce friendly neighbors in Iraq, Afghanistan and else- where, while building a nuclear deterrent for the long run. As a bonus, emphasizing external threats — including the key Arab bogeyman, Israel — draws the attention of young Iranians away from their complaints about poor governance and uncertain economic prospects, and enables Tehran to gather support in the anti-Israel Arab “street” to undercut Sunni Arab governments. This line of Iranian policy is already drawing counter- moves from the area’s Sunni governments. It has led the Saudi Arabian government, in particular, to revive King Abdullah’s initiative toward an Israeli-Palestinian settle- ment (previously sidelined by the Israeli and U.S. govern- ments), and to help the Lebanese government resist Hezbollah’s pressure for greater influence in Lebanon (contrary to the thrust of Iranian and Syrian policy). Further discussions among Sunni governments and with- in the Arab League are clearly under way, and they appear to have quiet American and other European encourage- ment. Even talk of a need to process nuclear fuel in a country such as Saudi Arabia (which holds the world’s largest oil reserves) has begun. American Incentives It is here that negotiations with Washington become attractive for Tehran. The Americans can be helpful to Iran in countering a variety of uncomfortable develop- ments or actual threats that may arise after any precipitous departure from Iraq or Afghanistan, such as: • Civil war in Iraq between Sunnis (supported by out- siders) fighting Iran-supported Shias, thus accentuating the Sunni-Shia split to the regional disadvantage of Iran; • Splits among the Shia militias in Iraq, along the lines of the internecine Christian and Muslim conflicts in Lebanon, which Iran cannot control; • Creation of a Kurdish state with claims to sections of Iran, and the probability of Kurdish clashes with Turkey leading to repeated disorder on Iran’s borders; and • A resurgence of the Taliban as a threat to Iran’s interests and a possible magnet for certain por- tions of its population. Conversely, there are many ways in which Washington could make the regime uncomfortable; e.g., supporting anti-Iranian moves in the Sunni world and imposing additional financial and other sanctions that would drag on interminably (as in the Libyan and Cuban cases). Also, once American troops disengage from Iraq, and possibly Afghanistan, Washington gains the advantage of more options against Tehran without running the risk of Iranian countermeasures locally. (This contingency in itself suggests it would be a mistake for Iran to promote anti-American mischief-making in Iraq or Afghanistan aimed at kicking the Americans and British out precipi- tously.) We should note in passing that failure to reach viable agreement with the Americans would reinforce Tehran’s determination to develop a nuclear deterrent despite the political and economic liabilities Iran might incur, as I out- lined in this magazine a year ago (“Iranian Nuclear Wea- pons: Advantage or Liability?”). Show Confidence, Not Arrogance The IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, at American instigation, continue to demand that Iran sus- pend its nuclear enrichment processes before negotia- tions begin, in return for the U.N. Security Council sus- pending the relatively mild sanctions it recently agreed to apply. This approach resembles the failed attempt to impose preconditions in the North Korean case — and, indeed, the current demand that the Palestinian Nation- al Authority explicitly recognize Israel before those negotiations proceed. Giving in to such preconditions is seen by the weaker party as an admission of weakness, not strength, feeding its resistance to talks. Furthermore, once negotiations do begin, they are likely to focus on obtaining from the very start what those demands have been asking for (as with North Korea). Thus it doesn’t make sense to insist on F O C U S 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 7 Tehran has already offered several times to talk to the U.S. about developments and possible cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq.