The Foreign Service Journal, June 2008

First, how in the world does it make sense to allow locally engaged staff members to run vital offices like GSO, FMO and HRO without daily over- sight by U.S. personnel? Unless every post only hires expatriate Ameri- can citizens for these positions, they will have to give Foreign Service Nationals unprecedented access. And let’s be honest, please: given widespread staff shortages and crushing workloads, meaningful supervision of LES- run sections would not occur. At a minimum, the potential for breaches of privacy is staggering. Even without access to classified information, determined employees could assemble enough bits of financial data to draw fairly accurate conclusions And at worst, such access would open up to the host government sensitive personal information regarding mission person- nel. What wonderful fodder for intelligence services! Let me cite a parallel from my own experience. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, I was employed by Citibank. I very much enjoyed the work and even con- sidered pursuing an overseas position with the company. Let’s say I was working for Citibank overseas and a U.S. intelligence organization asked me to pass along any inter- esting information I acquired about my host country. Would I? Sure, in a New York minute. Above all, I’m a loyal American. The following question then arises: Why do we expect anything but the same national loyalty from the host-country citizens we employ? Then there is the issue of physical security. Anyone who has been in the Foreign Service long enough learns the difference between being protected by local contrac- tors and by Marine security guards. I personally have never seen an embassy controlled by local contractors that cannot be easily penetrated. Couple this reality with the fact that a facsimile of our building pass can be found through various photos of people wearing them in previ- ous editions of State magazine, readily available on the Internet, and you have a train wreck waiting to happen. Last but certainly not least, we should be concerned about the impact of this initiative on the security of com- puter networks. Back in 2004, I completed the Manager Information Assurance Training run by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. It was a good course, providing lots of detail about information technology security and the breaches that can occur. At one point, the instructors demonstrated the step-by-step process through which Information Resource Management Bureau administrators can access e-mail accounts to ensure that the user community is abiding by all of the security regulations. Such checks are supposed to be done randomly, but I soon realized that several FSN personnel in the class were learning how to read the e-mails of other people. I became so concerned that I stayed after class one day and questioned the two instructors about this (they happened to be outsourced contractors). They responded that DS had approved the training and the target audience, so there was no need for corrective action. Also, don’t forget the recent revelations that consular contractors repeatedly read the passport files of the three leading presidential candidates and other prominent Americans. Supposedly, they did so only out of idle curiosity. But imagine what damage they could have done if malice had been their motivation. Particularly in friendly, English-speaking countries, we can easily forget that LES personnel belong to a different society, which may have a significantly distinct political agenda. Letting down our guard further by removing even the vestige of close American oversight is misguided. Maybe other agencies’ concerns about our organiza- tion have a foundation after all! Follow the Money The second downside of this program is financial. Yes, implementing this program would generate some short- term savings. After all, if Dell or FedEx instantaneously terminated all its floor managers and foremen on the assumption that any intelligent employee could perform their work without oversight, I am sure that profits would tick up — at least for the first month or two. However, these companies are in business for the long haul and know that such a short-sighted move would seri- ously backfire. There is no substitute for the “value added” that experienced professionals bring to the work- place. This is particularly true of Foreign Service employ- ees, who draw on the expertise they’ve gained at many previous posts. Even if that weren’t the case, the initial savings would still be negated by the cost of the fraud investigations that would surely follow. Putting local staff in charge of finan- F O C U S 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 8 LES empowerment has three major flaws: security, costs and accountability.