The Foreign Service Journal, June 2008

J U N E 2 0 0 8 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 47 he wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to place severe strains not only on the military but also the State Depart- ment and other foreign affairs agencies. Some commentators have cast this prob- lem as a rivalry (usually reflecting less well on the civilian component, unfairly slammed for sup- posedly not pulling its own weight), but that focus is mis- placed. In fact, as the success of numerous Provincial Recon- struction Teams in both war zones demonstrates, intera- gency cooperation between State and Defense has the potential to mitigate the staffing shortfalls that continue to hamper both agencies. For example, the military should be providing security escorts for State Department officials, rather than private contractors like Blackwater. After all, who better to provide security than the military, and who better to assist with reconciliation efforts and infrastructure development than Foreign Service officers? Instead, there is little direct coordination between State and DOD at the ground level, where it is most needed. As a result, the military finds itself in a quagmire in which it is required to conduct a full range of operations ill-suited to its current force structure. Foreign Service officers find them- selves excluded from the decisionmaking process because of the danger they face whenever they request permission to venture beyond the Green Zone in Baghdad or into the field elsewhere. And both organizations find themselves increas- ingly dependent on private contractors to function in the field. The NSC: Missing in Action Ideally, the National Security Council would ensure that joint planning produces operations that achieve results con- sistent with overarching political goals. Interagency coordi- nation does occur at the highest levels within the NSC and at joint headquarters. Unfortunately, however, for some time now successive national security advisers have proven utterly incapable of coordinating efforts by competing bureaucracies. In an attempt to paper over this deficiency, the Bush administration created the position of assistant to the presi- dent for Iraq, with Lt. General Douglas E. Lute serving in that capacity. As the so-called war czar, Gen. Lute is respon- sible for synchronizing efforts by all governmental agencies concerning Iraq and Afghanistan. Paradoxically, however, that appointment merely high- lights the weaknesses inherent in the current system. Lute must work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, as well as with the Central Command combatant commander and the Multinational Corps-Iraq commander. This abundance of senior officers within the decisionmaking process raises the question: Is there any unity of command within Iraq or Afghanistan? Needed: A New Goldwater-Nichols Act The antidote to the current epidemic of rogue personal security contractors and lack of intergovernmental agency coordination is to enact legislation that would synchronize the operations of the military, State Department and other B UILDING ON THE G OLDWATER -N ICHOLS A CT I NTERAGENCY COOPERATION BETWEEN S TATE AND D EFENSE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO MITIGATE THE STAFFING SHORTFALLS THAT CONTINUE TO HAMPER BOTH DEPARTMENTS . T B Y T IMOTHY K. H SIA Timothy K. Hsia is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, where he received a degree in military history. A U.S. Army captain, he is currently deployed on his second tour to Iraq.