The Foreign Service Journal, June 2008

governmental agencies within the national security apparatus. Fortun- ately, an effective model exists. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the most profound, forward- looking national security legislation of the last quarter-century, perhaps best known for creating the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since then, the military services have made vast strides in fusing their orga- nizations and operations. In Iraq, for instance, U.S. Army units like mine work in conjunction with their sister services down to the platoon level. The military has become a one- stop shop for the nation’s overseas requirements, from defeating oppos- ing militaries to nationbuilding and humanitarian assistance, thanks to Goldwater-Nichols. But this has been a mixed blessing. As the strongest and most visible portion of the national security apparatus, the Department of Defense has gradually become the agency which the United States relies upon for the majority of contingen- cies. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military finds itself conducting nationbuilding efforts and pursuing the reconciliation of sectarian griev- ances, even as it continues to battle insurgents. By passing an interagency Gold- water-Nichols Act that encompasses the State Department and the other foreign affairs agencies, as well as the armed forces, Congress could ensure unity of command, effort and re- sources. This rationalization would maximize each entity’s strengths while minimizing redundancies and weak- nesses. That formalized chain of command would be held responsible for ensuring that our nation’s goals and foreign policy efforts are realized. In particular, just as the original leg- islation created a chairman for the JCS, the new version should establish a Foreign Policy Director —who should be a civilian — in order to orchestrate all the instruments of national policy. Only an individual who is unaligned with either executive agency can be unbiased and possess the authority to focus on the nation’s foreign policy goals, as opposed to protecting tradi- tional spheres of influence. It would be unpardonable if the current Army secretary were to criti- cize an Air Force chief because his airmen only serve six-month tours, as opposed to the Army’s 15-month tours. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would not allow it. Similar infighting between the State Depart- ment and military would not be toler- ated under a Foreign Policy Director’s leadership. The Right Tools for the Job The 2002 book Eating Soup with a Knife by Lt. Colonel John Nagl has gained favor among many officers within the U.S. Army for its recom- mendations on improving counterin- surgency operations. Nagl’s basic premise is that the military should embrace wholeheartedly the conun- drums posed by nationbuilding and counterinsurgency. His work is in- complete, however, because it focuses predominantly on what the military can do to defeat insurgents. He does not adequately factor in the potential of civilian agencies like the State Department to assist in that effort. In fact, the assumption that the military should always take the lead in counterinsurgency is unwarranted. The underlying problem is that the military — a knife, in Nagl’s analogy — is ill suited to fight insurgencies because of its very structure and form. Accordingly, the United States needs to employ the State Department and other civilian agencies as the spoon in its counterinsurgency strategy. In a March 2007 article published in the Foreign Service Journal , Dr. Barbara Stephenson, the deputy senior adviser to the Secretary of State and deputy coordinator for Iraq, stated that “diplomats have longer time horizons than the military” and that counterinsurgency work is “20 percent military and 80 percent everything else. The Foreign Service brings the strategic vision to the pic- ture.” If this percentage of work is translated to manpower, then our force structure in Iraq and Afghani- stan is the opposite of what is ideal. Critics often insist that security must be in place before diplomacy and infrastructure improvements can commence in a war zone. But this conviction ignores the fact that there are no phased timelines in counterin- surgency, and the reality that security, proper governance and infrastructure development should happen concur- rently. Otherwise, it is impossible to sustain change for the better. We must also realize that we will never be fully successful in nation- building and counterinsurgency ef- forts. Even with its abundant re- sources and best efforts, America can never singlehandedly rebuild a coun- try or eliminate insurgents — particu- larly when the local leaders are cor- rupt, inept or less than fully commit- ted to the effort. But that does not mean progress is unattainable. In fact, the kind of joint coordination between the military and State Department that will make 48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 8 Even with its abundant resources and best efforts, America can never singlehandedly rebuild a country or eliminate insurgents.