The Foreign Service Journal, June 2009

34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 0 9 officials. Administration of the silent treatment was meant to punish the Sudanese for their want of firmness in the face of terrorism. Nixon had just recently resigned and Henry Kissinger, who had become Secretary of State while remaining national se- curity adviser, was in undisputed con- trol of foreign policy. Within days of my arrival, I re- ceived a cable outlining “U.S. Policy Toward Sudan inWake of Terrorist Release” (State 169610, sent Aug. 2, 1974; declassified Sept. 25, 2002): “Conclusion is that Pres. Nimeiri’s decision to release terrorists to PLO for execution of commuted sentences is incompatible with continuation of cooperative ties. ... In addition to substance of decision, manner in which it was made and USG learned of it showed scant courtesy to highest level USG. ... In deal- ings with GOS, Emboffs should continue correct posture, meeting with officials at their request. ... You should re- spond to specific assistance requests of all types with state- ment that you will submit them to Washington for consideration, but that GOS should not RPT not expect early response.” But there was a problem. Several months earlier, the militant arm of the Eritrean Liberation Front had kid- napped several people, killed one and released a few. They were still holding four, including two Americans, some- where in the wilds of northern Ethiopia. Neither Embassy Addis Ababa nor the Ethiopian government, which was in its last days, had any good intelligence on the exact where- abouts of the hostages, much less any leverage on their cap- tors. The best avenue to information about and subsequent resolution of this terrorist incident passed through the se- curity services of the blacklisted Sudanese government. How to overcome this obstacle? While I sought and weighed assurances from Eritrean interlocutors in Khar- toum that the hostages were in good health, the Sudanese security services were ever so quietly encouraged to pursue efforts to secure an end to the episode. With their help, the hostages emerged unscathed at the border in Septem- ber and departed the next day for the United States. Khar- toum’s interests and Washington’s had both been served. Modest Recommendations The instruction givenme before I left Brussels for Khar- toum was, basically, to keep my mouth shut; but it did not occur to me to stop thinking. Not convinced that our policies were pro- ducing positive results; concerned that they were sowing confusion in the Sudanese government and, via the diplomatic corps, abroad; and reasoning that Khartoum’s actions paled in comparison to the murders themselves, I undertook to draft for country team approval our joint ap- preciation of the situation and rec- ommendations for future steps (Khartoum 2100, sent Sept. 11, 1974; declassified Nov. 15, 2001). In brief, we recounted the Sudanese political motives for ridding themselves of the prisoners and reviewed U.S. national interests in ending the stalemate that in combina- tion could be said to outweigh the Sudanese action. We suggested that the Sudanese contribution to the release of the ELF hostages deserved some recognition and proposed engaging our hosts openly to fully explain U.S. policy (for the first time) and explore Sudanese willingness to take ap- propriate measures to overcome the impasse. The department’s terse, unresponsive and essentially dismissive reply — containing not a hint that our analysis and recommendations had been read, much less consid- ered — arrived three weeks later (State 218518, sent Oct. 3, 1974; declassified Nov. 15, 2001): “... Our policy remains unchanged with respect to Sudan.” I realized that the so- briquet bestowed on me by a friendly colleague was on the mark: Chargé de rien faire (that is, in charge of doing noth- ing). Not until 32 years later did I learn that senior American officials such as Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco had been asking the Ethiopians to release some ELF prisoners to ease negotiations for the release of the hostages (State 171544, sent Aug. 6, 1974; declassified May 4, 2006). In other words, we were asking others to deal with terrorists while we maintained an uncompromising position. Fast forward to July 1982, when I arrived in Athens as chargé d’affaires and was enlisted almost immediately in an effort led by U.S. diplomat Philip Habib to avert a regional disaster. The Israeli army under General Ariel Sharon had surrounded Yasser Arafat, some 1,000 of his fighters and many other Palestinians in the port area of Beirut, and was F O C U S Administration of the silent treatment was meant to punish the Sudanese for their want of firmness in the face of terrorism.