The Foreign Service Journal, June 2009

J U N E 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37 threats (labeled something else) from those they knew had ordered the Khartoum killings within days of the dreadful event, perhaps even before Cleo Noel and Curt Moore had been laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery. If Nixon and Kissinger thought it essential to negotiate quietly with Arafat for reasons related to broader Middle East policy, they might have saved lives in the process by doing so several days earlier, instead of going on the air with macho pos- turing that can be said to have triggered the Khartoum murders. The United States must without question have a firm policy, stated and on the record, regarding terrorism, as well as the human and material resources for carrying out that policy. But the incidents cited above make certain lessons self-evident. First, it is foolish, pointless and potentially dangerous to trumpet policy at every turn. Secondly, we have no right, moral or legal, to encourage other governments to negotiate while we stand aloof on principle. Thirdly, di- versionary tactics aimed at concealing our role in negoti- ations serve no real purpose and may skew policy on other important issues. Finally, we must rid ourselves of the notion that flex- ibility is weakness. It cannot be excluded that a particu- lar situation will require negotiations, perhaps direct, perhaps via a third party, in order to save lives, both American and others. The key requirement is to focus on vital interests rather than policies in determining how to respond to specific incidents. The interests of both parties to a ne- gotiation can often be accommodated, whereas neither policy set in cement nor ideological rigidity leaves room or hope for compromise. To the best of my knowledge, the evidence presented above has received no previous mention in the main- streammedia, at home or abroad, although it is based on government documents declassi- fied and released as long ago as 2006. The depressing conclusion is that old news is no news, no mat- ter how important in substance. Perhaps that explains official con- fidence that publication of old se- crets will make no waves. Equally disheartening, Henry Kissinger’s reputation as the supreme master of foreign affairs would probably suffer no damage even if the story I have told were broadcast beyond the circle of the Journal ’s devoted readership. Does anybody care, including those in our own For- eign Service community? I do. I am certain I would not have chosen the career I did had I known what I now know about the dishonesty and deceit in high places — an awful truth I have stumbled upon only in retirement. F O C U S Within days of the Khartoum murders, the CIA had been authorized to pursue negotiations with a trusted Arafat aide.