The Foreign Service Journal, June 2011

26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 1 1 institutions in these areas are stressed and often under TCO influence. But those organizations no more have political agendas than do the ItalianMafia or ‘Ndrangheta, the Chinese tongs, the Japanese yakuza or the Russian bratva. Moreover, however sensational the news of drug mur- ders may appear in the American media, annual per capita Mexican murder rates in 2009 (the last year for which full figures are available) were less than a third of what they were in Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Jamaica, and less than half of Colombia’s. Crime Isn’t the Only Problem Even without narcotics and law enforcement issues to contend with, the last decade has been rough for Mex- ico and for its relations with Washington. The Fox-Bush honeymoon lasted only through the Fox state visit to Washington in the first week of September 2001. Then came the 9/11 attacks. The foreign ministers of the Americas were meeting in Lima that day, and Mexico joined the chorus of con- demnation over the attacks. Even so, prospects for the immigration legislation that Fox had hoped for, already dim, receded even further. The Fox administration bent over backward to make sure that no terrorists entered the U.S. from Mexico, but it stopped short of supporting the Bush administration’s position on Iraq. Mexico’s absten- tion from the U.N. Security Council resolution seeking authorization for U.S. intervention caused lasting heart- burn in the Bush administration. The Texas Supreme Court didn’t help relations in 2002 by refusing to stay the execution of a Mexican convicted of murder, even after the International Court of Justice had ruled that his case (and 50 other death row cases) should be reopened on procedural grounds. Fox then canceled a visit to the Bush ranch in Texas. Economic issues added to the gloom. Dogged already by the H1N1 scare, Mexico’s economy took the biggest hit of all countries from the global recession. There was no cumulative net gross domestic product growth for 2008-2010. In fact, average annual growth for the decade was only 1.3 percent, compared with an average for Latin America and the Caribbean of 3 percent. After surpass- ing Japan during the 1990s, Mexico fell behind China in trade with the U.S. Even the vaunted North American Free Trade Agree- ment (which the Obama campaign had made vague noises about renegotiating) proved to be as much an irritant as a blessing, at least for a time. The agreement stipulates that Mexican trucks must be allowed into the U.S., but the U.S. Congress effectively suspended implementation of the measure two years ago. Mexico responded with re- taliatory tariffs on a range of American imports. The issue was only tentatively resolved in the two presidents’ meet- ing on March 3. Mexico has no shortage of good economists, and many recognize that the country’s declining competitiveness in global trade indices is due to the administration’s stalled reform program. Unable to rely on the rubber-stamp leg- islatures that the PRI could count on before 1997, neither Fox nor Calderon has yet been able to achieve the anti- monopoly and labor reform laws that are badly needed to boost productivity. After a long fight in 2007-2008, the Congress did pass limited measures to help encourage private-sector investment in the petroleum industry. But the Mexican oil bonanza is still drying up, and it’s not yet clear whether deep-sea drilling can reverse the trend. Despite all these woes, Calderon’s feisty spirit and un- willingness to compromise with the TCOs have made him many friends and admirers, both at home and in the U.S. Recent polls have shown declining public confidence in the Mexican government’s ability to win the drug wars, but a majority still endorses the president’s efforts. No Escape Because U.S. and Mexican presidents will both be elected next year, 2012 represents a watershed. Calderon’s party lost many legislative seats in the 2009 midterm elections, so he may find it hard to transfer his mantle to another PAN presidential candidate. (All Mex- ican presidents are limited to a single six-year term.) The betting today is that the PRI, which holds 19 of 32 gover- norships, stands the best chance of regaining the presi- dential palace next year. Whoever succeeds Calderon will be tempted to seek reduced violence through accommodation of TCOs, ap- plying the law selectively against only the most brutal vi- olators. Some Mexican critics are already advocating this. But formulating consistent, explainable guidelines for such a policy would be next to impossible and would en- danger firm support from Washington. Being “so close to the United States” is never easy. One can only hope that the next Mexican president will find that the benefits outweigh the burdens. F O C U S