The Foreign Service Journal, June 2011

30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 1 1 tries would both benefit from new global commercial arrangements. By joining forces, the world’s two leading food exporters could increase the chances of reviving the nearly mori- bund Doha global trade talks — a de- clared priority of both nations. How- ever, that would require them to make politically difficult concessions, not only on agricultural issues, but also on trade in services, industrial tariffs and intellectual property. Brazil would have to press its closest Doha allies (including India and China) to give ground on these issues, while the U.S. would confront a bitter do- mestic political battle. One issue on which the U.S. and Brazil have found agreement is China’s undervaluation of its currency, which makes the Asian giant an unfair competitor. Although the two countries are not prepared to jointly pressure Beijing, they are pursuing reinforcing efforts. Yet while the two capitals hold a common position on China’s exchange poli- cies, Brazil is also a vocal critic of the U.S. Federal Re- serve’s “quantitative easing,” a policy that it claims holds down the value of the dollar. Brazil has worked hard to gain increased authority for itself and other developing nations in multilateral forums, and Washington has largely supported its demands for stronger representation and influence at the United Na- tions, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO and other global institutions. The U.S. was a strong advo- cate for replacing the Group of 7 (now the Group of 8) — all rich, highly industrialized countries — with the G-20 (which includes Brazil and other important developing countries) as the principal forum for debating global eco- nomic questions. Still, Washington’s reluctance to support Brazil’s long- standing aspiration for a permanent seat on the U.N. Se- curity Council has been particularly disappointing to Brazilians. The issue became even more galling last No- vember, when Pres. Obama endorsed India’s claim to a Se- curity Council seat. With its global status and influence still rising, Brazil will eventually have its own seat. The question is whether Washington will get out in front of this issue or will stand back and await the inevitable. Brazilians will not soon forget America’s choice. Both countries are at the center of international debates on climate change and energy use. In particular, global efforts to address these issues will be crucially affected by how Brazil man- ages the Amazon, develops its biofuel industry and exploits its huge, un- tapped petroleum reserves, as well as U.S. policies. What remains uncertain is whether the two nations will end up mostly cooperating or colliding on these and other global challenges. A mix of the two is the most likely out- come. Moving Toward Partnership? A question often raised in both Brazil and the United States is whether the two nations should be seeking to form a “strategic partnership.” What such an arrangement would mean in practice and how it would serve the inter- ests of the two countries are both topics worth debating, but progress in that direction appears remote for the time being. Over the past dozen years, Brazil has clearly shown its ability to pursue its international aims despite minimal U.S. support. It has widely diversified its global relations and built strong ties to an array of industrial and developing countries. As a result, it exercises considerable influence in almost every regional and international forum, usually independent of the U.S. and sometimes even in opposi- tion to it. Dilma may succeed in shaping a closer rela- tionship with Washington, but her administration hardly seems ready to move toward a full partnership. For its part, whileWashington is monitoring Brazil’s ris- ing power and reach, it does not yet consider Brasilia a major force in global economic affairs or a relevant actor in regard to U.S. security challenges. Nor do U.S. policy- makers view Brazilian foreign policy as consistently reli- able or responsible. Brazil’s relations with Tehran and defense of its nuclear program continue to make U.S. of- ficials wary. They have also been troubled by Brazil’s inat- tention to democracy, human rights and nuclear pro- liferation in its diplomacy. It is still an open question whether Dilma will be able to make significant changes to Brazilian policy on these issues. Still, even when bilateral relations have become strained in recent years, the two countries have never been adversaries. Rather, they have almost always sought to moderate and defuse their disputes, and have been willing to tolerate considerable disagreement. Building and sus- F O C U S The most serious clashes between the U.S. and Brazil are likely to arise over global, not regional, issues.