The Foreign Service Journal, June 2011

J U N E 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 33 to be just another moderate Latin American leftist. Chávez skillfully promoted that view, promising that his adminis- tration would promote foreign in- vestment, among other things. In retrospect, he clearly played upon a tradition of Western naiveté going back a half-century, to the myth that if only the Eisenhower administration had shown a will- ingness to cooperate with Fidel Castro’s regime from the very beginning, Havana would never have ended up in the Soviet camp. Actions Speak Louder Than Words U.S. policy, when Chávez came to office, was to ex- tend the hand of friendship, in the hope that he would, indeed, turn out to be a pragmatic member of the left- center with his country’s interests at heart. That bet, if it could be called that, initially looked like a winner. Early in his first term, Pres. Chávez con- tinued to talk of the need to promote investment and to continue to support private business. He kept on the Caldera administration’s highly respected minister of finance, Maritza Izaguirre, and submitted a modern “investment protection” bill to the Venezuelan Con- gress, which passed it. And he charmed just about everyone on his June 1999 visits to New York and Houston. But another Chávez was hard at work behind the scenes, drafting a new constitution that vastly increased the powers of the national executive and undermined Petróleos de Venezuela, the country’s national oil com- pany. “Don’t pay attention to what we say, but watch what we do.” That’s what John Mitchell, President Richard Nixon’s attorney general, once told a reporter. That ad- vice fits the Chávez administration to a “T.” Even as Pres. Chávez affirmed his commitment to democracy and the rule of law, his administration was busily flouting treaty obligations and legal commitments. Examples include the decision to bar Colombian trucks from entering Venezuela (a treaty violation), the refusal to authorize annual CANTV (telephone company) rate increases (a contract violation), and the decisions to “sus- pend” the Frameca (Caracas Metro Line 4 contract) and Aucoven (Caracas-La Guaira toll road concession contract) — all within the new administration’s first three months in power. The prohibition on Colombian trucks presaged a steady deterio- ration in relations with Bogota, culminating in Venezuela’s with- drawal from the Andean Commu- nity and a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations on two sepa- rate occasions. Despite some recent improvement, re- lations between Caracas and Bogota remain on tenter- hooks. The beginnings of what was to become a virulent anti-U.S. stance could also be seen during Chávez’s first months as president. His government declared that there were no human rights violations in Cuba and re- fused to allow U.S. planes to pass through Venezuelan airspace on their way to Colombia on drug-spotting mis- sions. In January 2000, the Chávez administration turned back two shiploads of road-clearing machinery the U.S. had sent to assist in the effort to repair Venezuela’s flood- ravaged coastal highways. Though the aid had been re- quested in December by beleaguered Venezuelan authorities, the Chávez administration changed its mind at the last minute. By then, it should have been clear to all concerned that the new leader was no friend of the United States. What was not to become clear for several years, how- ever, was the extent to which Chávez had the will, and the means, to wreak terrible damage on the interests of the United States and the fragile democracies of the re- gion. Instead, too many analysts dismissed him as a clown (“I smell the odor of sulfur,” he quipped as he fol- lowed President George W. Bush at a podium at the United Nations). At home, his administration pursued the gradual de- struction of all democratic and free-market institutions. Foreign investors — oil and mining companies at first, telephone and electricity companies next and, most re- cently, food processors and distributors —were harassed and their assets seized, often without the Venezuelan government bothering to go through the motions of complying with the requisite legal and constitutional procedures. F O C U S When Chávez came to office, the U.S. extended the hand of friendship in the hope that he really was a pragmatist.