The Foreign Service Journal, June 2011

J U N E 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35 jos that culminated in an agree- ment to transfer control of the Panama Canal to Panama on Dec. 31, 1999. Presidents Pérez and Luis Herrera also played key roles in the effort to pacify Central America. Neglect of the bilateral rela- tionship on both sides left officials from both countries completely off guard when a group of military officers, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, at- tempted a coup on Feb. 4, 1992. The documents left be- hind by the plotters very clearly identified the ringleaders, including Chávez, as being ideologically of the extreme left, if not outright communists, with close ties to Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Sadly, the country’s elites failed to understand the nature of the threat posed by Chávez’s move- ment and, even more importantly, the reasons for his popular appeal. Even sadder, many members of Venezuela’s political and intellec- tual elite not only sympathized with, or supported, the coup backers (known as chavistas) but went on to work full time to undermine the Pérez ad- ministration’s efforts to address the population’s needs and concerns. This, along with charges of widespread government cor- ruption, paved the way for Hugo Chávez to be elected pres- ident on Dec. 6, 1998, a position he has held ever since. — Robert Bottome F O C U S Even sadder, many members of Venezuela’s political and intellectual elite supported the 1992 coup attempt. April 2002: A Setback for All Popular resistance to the changes being wrought by the Chávez administration, especially regarding the oil indus- try, culminated on April 11, 2002, as some 800,000 Venezuelans marched on the Miraflores presidential palace calling for the president’s resignation. Armed Chávez supporters fired on the protesters, leaving 19 dead and effectively preventing the march from reaching the presidential palace. (It was later reported that Chávez had ordered the Venezuelan Army to fire on the marchers, but for reasons not entirely understood, the army high command refused to act on that order.) Several hours later, Chávez agreed to resign as presi- dent on the condition that he and his family be given safe passage to Cuba. The vice president was nowhere to be found. Accordingly, it was up to the Venezuelan Congress to appoint a successor to Chávez. In the ensuing confusion, Pedro Carmona Estanga, a businessman, was asked to form a new government. Un- fortunately, instead of appealing to Congress for authori- zation to proceed, Carmona appointed himself president on April 12. That action delegitimized his nascent admin- istration, alienated virtually all of his potential supporters and cleared the way for Chávez to reassume the presi- dency on April 13. Chávez subsequently tried to blame the United States for his short-lived ouster, accusing the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and President George W. Bush of complicity. But the U.S. had absolutely nothing to do with the events of that weekend. In fact, Ambassador Charles Shapiro, acting on orders fromWashington, made a special effort to contact Carmona on April 12, warning that America would not support him if he swore himself in without complying with the Venezuelan Constitution. Carmona reportedly told Shapiro that “we know what we are doing” and proceeded to condemn himself and his nas- cent administration to failure. The U.S. government has been widely criticized for its supposed failure to denounce Hugo Chávez’s removal from office, which several of his supporters were describ- ing as a coup at an Organization of American States meet- ing taking place that very same day in Costa Rica. But the fact is that Chávez resigned, so there was no coup to de- nounce. At the same time, there was no new government in Caracas to recognize or support — a situation which would explain Washington’s decision to say nothing at the time (i.e., Friday, April 12, 2002). The George W. Bush administration does, perhaps, de- serve to be criticized for its failure to denounce Pedro Car- mona’s actions, particularly his self-proclamation as presi- dent. That step definitely qualified as a coup, which Amb. Shapiro had warned Carmona is exactly how Washington would treat it.