The Foreign Service Journal, June 2012

trends. Although I spent most of my career and adulthood in Africa, my ex- perience has been much more about working in “societies in transition,” which is what the continent is all about — political and social evolution, and transition from autocracies to more participatory, humane forms of society. But transitions take time, and achiev- ing policy objectives requires sustained diplomatic engagement. FSJ: Perhaps we could talk briefly about each of your tours as chief of mis- sion, beginning with your tenure in what was then called the People’s Re- public of the Congo (1979-1981). You arrived in Brazzaville not long after Denis Sassou-Nguesso became presi- dent following a military coup, correct? How did you approach your mission in such a challenging environment? WLS: I was actually the first Amer- ican ambassador to serve there since Washington and Brazzaville had sus- pended relations in 1963. Shortly after his election, President Jimmy Carter had received an overture from then- President Joachim Yhomby-Opango, which had led to the sudden resump- tion of bilateral relations and the need to send an ambassador to Brazzaville. Although Pres. Yhombi-Opango ac- corded me agrément, by the time I ar- rived he had been deposed by Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso. It was the lat- ter leader who receivedmy credentials. There were other rather intriguing aspects to my tour in the Congo. Rus- sians were omnipresent, and the French were still a dominant force in the economy, with the newly arrived Americans somewhat suspect on all sides. I “lost” the Peace Corps within the first two months, but managed to use Brazzaville’s centennial in 1980 to put matters on a more promising tra- jectory. Pres. Carter sent a delegation to Brazzaville on Air Force One to mark the occasion, thereby opening up a much more friendly relationship. FSJ: Similarly, your tenure as am- bassador in Monrovia (1981-1985) began the year after Samuel Doe’s bru- tal coup d’etat. Despite Doe’s abysmal human rights record and political legit- imacy, he managed to meet twice with President Ronald Reagan and enjoyed considerable U.S. financial support throughout the decade. How did you balance the competing objectives of promoting a return to democracy and the rule of law in Liberia with the desire to maintain traditionally strong ties with a longtime ally? WLS: Your question states very well the paradox I faced in Liberia. On the one hand, I was thrilled at the prospect of representing our country to one of its oldest African allies and friends. But on the other, I faced the prospect of helping to create a degree of political and economic stability in a country just taken over by a group of soldiers with no capacity to govern responsibly. It all started very badly: several days after presentation of my credentials, Doe had executed his vice head of state while I was delivering a five-hour de- marche. Doe’s initial meeting with Pres. Rea- gan, part of a 15-day official trip to the U.S., was designed to start a transition process to restore confidence in a coun- try reeling from the coup d’etat — in particular, with regard to Liberia’s im- portant maritime flag of convenience. After our return to Monrovia, matters worsened, to the point that the Doe government threatened to declare me persona non grata. I obviously hadn’t done the diplomatic slalom very well! During my fourth and final year at post, we seriously considered, but then backed away from, implementing a set of tight controls over Liberian financial transactions. FSJ: As if those assignments were not challenging enough, your next am- bassadorship was in South Africa, where you served from 1989 to 1992. How did you pursue efforts to facilitate a peaceful end to apartheid and a tran- sition to full democracy? WLS: In a word, it was a matter of building credibility and confidence with the African National Congress while convincing my government in- terlocutors that I was acting in their in- terest, as well. The African National Congress was extremely skeptical, if not hostile, about U.S. policy, so I took a step-by-step approach, sending signals. Several stand out in my recollection. I began by inviting the ANC repre- sentative in Washington to my swear- ing-in ceremony at State, and formally recognized her presence. In my re- marks, I tried to cast diplomacy as dia- logue and was quoted the following week in Time magazine as saying: “To refuse to talk to someone is not a policy, and to talk to someone is not a political declaration.” Next, while passing through London on my way to South Africa, I sought an appointment with Oliver Tambo. He was in Sweden recuperating, so I met with Adelaide Tambo, his wife. A brief meeting over tea led to dinner together with her and her son, the actor, who joined us. Afterward, she sent a mes- sage to the ANC office in Swaziland to tell them that it was all right to deal with me. Then I began attending funerals in Soweto, which provided the easiest op- portunity to meet WinnieMandela and other leading ANC figures. In addi- tion, I drew on my contacts with the ANC frommy time in Liberia to invite Albertina Sisulu, the wife of Walter Sisulu, to dinner at the residence. She 20 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J U N E 2 0 1 2 “I have never subscribed to ‘Afro-pessimism,’ I believe that those who do misread developments and trends.”