The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2013 15 A s Iran appears to be rushing to obtain nuclear weapons— less for prestige than as a deterrent against potential attack—President Barack Obama starkly warns that he will not permit it to do so. Yet even though the on-again, off-again negotiating process continues to floun- der, buying time for Tehran to pursue that goal, there is still a perfectly sane way to avoid this looming train wreck. First, Iranian policymakers must overcome their fears and grasp the real- ity that America has not tried to reverse its revolution, now 34 years old. They must also accept that it makes no sense to seek a nuclear deterrent that raises international alarm and, in the final analysis, will not deter. Iran’s rulers will also have to con- front the fact that Israel’s security is a major factor in American politics and foreign policy. Given that Iran has no permanent conflicts of interest with the Jewish state, it must stop the pro- vocative threats that have characterized Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government. Even when rhetoric is not backed up by action, it can still have serious conse- quences. Finally, while Tehran cannot aban- don its long-time support of Shiites in Lebanon, dating back to the shah’s reign, it can counsel Hezbollah against military attacks on Israel and withhold assistance for them. Such an approach would not necessarily entail withdraw- ing general political support for Pales- tinian and other Arab grievances. For their part, American policymak- ers must be prepared to give explicit assurances that they will not try to overthrow Iran’s regime, and will end all sanctions, in return for credible evidence that Tehran is abandoning all nuclear development that is not for legitimate peaceful uses. (The details of fuel production, inspections and other safeguards can be left for the negotia- tors to work out.) In addition, Congress and the Obama administration will have to rec- ognize that the future of Iran’s govern- ance must be left to the Iranians them- selves. There can be no repeat of inter- ventions such as the 1953 coup, which rankles most Iranians to this day. A deal along these lines will become possible after Iran holds national elec- tions this month, allowing a new, hope- fully more unified, government to face up to the nuclear issue. No matter who leads it, he, his supporters and, most importantly, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who will remain as Iran’s Supreme Guide, must accept the fact that time is running out. To conduct meaningful negotiations, however, Tehran and Washington must put aside the less-important irritants, provocations, “Great Satan” name-call- ing and pervasive mistrust that contrib- ute to derailing a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. And they need to recognize that, even after that dispute is decided, important differences will persist on many issues. A Short Review of Recent History Lest this perspective seem to be coming from cloud cuckoo land, let us remind ourselves that since Iran’s 1979 revolution, the United States has made no serious moves to overthrow Ayatol- lah Khomeini’s Shiite Islamic regime. As Iran’s revolution was building up momentum in late 1978, the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the Department of State were well aware of how bit- terly most Iranians resented the covert American intervention of a quarter-cen- tury earlier, which restored the shah to his throne and ended what many Irani- ans still see as their best opportunity to create a viable democracy. The decision to let events unfold was facilitated when the shah confided to the American and British ambassadors (and probably to others) that he would under no circum- stances turn his formidable army on his own people to cling to the throne. The Carter administration tried sev- eral times to establish communications with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: first Iran and the United States: Getting to Yes BY GEORGE B . LAMBRAK I S George B. Lambrakis was a State Department Foreign Service officer from 1956 to 1985, after spending two years with the U.S. Information Agency in Vietnam and Laos. He was counselor for political affairs in Tehran at the time of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and also served as chargé d’affaires in Beirut, Bissau and Mbabane, among many other assignments. A professor of international relations and diplomacy, he now teaches international negotiation in London. SPEAKING OUT