The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

16 JUNE 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Iranian policymakers must accept that it makes no sense to seek a nuclear deterrent that raises international alarm and, in the final analysis, will not deter. through two well-placed merchants from the Tehran bazaar who trav- eled to Paris in late 1978 and returned deeply disappointed; then through the American embassy in Paris; and finally through my own visit to Khomeini’s right-hand man, Mohammed Beheshti, after the ayatollah’s return to Iran in January 1979. But all these efforts came to naught, for Khomeini was just not interested in talking to the “Great Satan.” (And Beheshti was assassinated soon after.) Then came Iran’s illegal seizure of the American embassy and imprison- ment of its diplomats for 14 months. In response to that provocation, the most the U.S. attempted was a limited (and unsuccessful) rescue operation in April 1980; the hostages were freed in January 1981 pursuant to the Algiers Accords, when the U.S. made it clear that it did not intend to overthrow the Khomeini regime. American and Iranian resentments certainly linger to this day from that drama, as well as from some other unfortunate events since then (e.g., America’s erroneous shooting down of a civilian Iranian airliner during the 1980- 1988 Iraq-Iran War, and Iran’s apparent involvement in some outrages against Americans in Lebanon and Europe). But neither Ronald Reagan nor any of his successors has ever tried to overthrow Iran’s regime, despite the heavy pres- ence of U.S. military forces in the region since the early 1990s. If anything, they have done Tehran the favor of removing threats from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Afghanistan’s Taliban. Indeed, in the 1980s, “Irangate” in- volved Tehran’s leaders in covert trans- actions for American arms with the Reagan administration and Israel, who wanted to procure Iran’s assistance for the release of American hostages in Lebanon (dealings which were only partly effective). Despite some limited congression- al support (and possibly covert U.S. financial assistance) for the die-hard, pro-shah opposition that has persisted ever since the 1979 revolution, it is only after the extent of Iran’s nuclear fuel enrichment program came to light that American policy began to harden. The threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, coupled with the regime’s calls for the destruction of Israel, its public support for Hezbollah and (Sunni) Hamas, and warnings of imaginary plot- ting by Americans and “Zionists,” has mobilized the United States, Israel and others to wield progressively tougher sanctions and other pressures against Tehran. Although these measures seem to be hurting more and more of Iran’s people, those in power are often able to evade them. Some Iran-watchers in academia and think-tanks believe this situation, taken together with the serious demonstrations in Tehran fol- lowing the last national elections, may be kindling fears in the government of a rising internal opposition (even if the demonstrations were brutally put down by the Pasdaran and Basij militias that protect the regime). This trend could prove significant, and disturbing to older hardliners, if a younger genera- tion without memories of the revolution becomes less enamoured of govern- ment under the mullahs and their paramilitary militias. I sometimes ride in a London taxi driven by a man named Ali. Now in his 40s, Ali left Iran when he was 23, and he returns to visit his family every few years. He told me they were suffering economi- cally. But he is not interested in politics, though he hears politics discussed all around him when in Iran. For him, the supreme guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a religious leader, and Islam teaches that its leaders do not lie to their follow- ers. The ayatollah says that Iran’s nuclear fuel is for peaceful purposes, and for Ali, that settles the matter. Ali was interested when I explained that the fuel was being enriched beyond the level needed for peaceful uses. If the ayatollah turned out to be lying, Ali replied after some thought, he would not know what to believe in any more. There are probably a lot of people like Ali in Iran today—people who formed the backbone of “Imam” Kho- meini’s revolution, and on whom the regime counts for legitimacy. This, too, is something that Tehran’s leaders no doubt keep in mind.