The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2013 17 Isolation Is Not a Good Basis for Decision-Making Those who are dealing with the nuclear issue would do well to consider these lessons from the past. In the final analysis, over three decades, America has not tried to reverse Iran’s revolution. President Obama has shown reluctance to pursue more overseas adventures. But he has also surprised observers by his boldness and determination when chal- lenged by clear and present dangers to the United States and to world stability. Iran’s leaders underestimate him at their peril. Simply to assume that others will act in a given situation as you would your- self is akin to what psychologists call “transference.” And in certain circum- stances, this can be very dangerous. To guard against it, American policymakers try to learn as much as they can about how differently Iranian leaders may process information. But it is even more important for Iran’s leaders to study how American and Israeli leaders might react. Making decisions based on misinter- pretation of the outside world’s leaders, values and reactions doomed Saddam Hussein—who had little experience of the world beyond Iraq and would not believe unwelcome reports his own people brought him. Today, Iran’s top rulers are as isolated as he was. Discount- ing unwelcome warnings of how others might react could bring an end to Iran’s regime, as well. Still, there is a good deal waiting to be made. For Iran, such an agreement will actually improve on the agreement that ended the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis by removing all sanctions—a concession not offered to Havana. This can then be presented to the Iranian people as their leaders’ sacrifice (or achievement) to end their suffering. How governance in Iran develops after that will be for the Iranians them- selves to decide. And those in power in Tehran are unlikely to be seriously both- ered in their internal governance as long as they do not threaten others. Finally, a word about process. With time running out, it would be better to aim higher than the routine step-by-step process of the past. As the Israeli-Pales- tinian and North Korean negotiations demonstrate, parties that do not trust each other often lose their enthusiasm for reaching the final goal once the lever- age that has brought them to negotiate in the first place is relaxed. The Dayton agreement that ended the war in the for- mer Yugoslavia, or the rapid, high-level negotiations with Muammar Qadhafi that terminated Libya’s quest for nuclear weapons, are better models to emulate. By the same token, the negotiations with Iran need to rise quickly to an appropriately high level. Final agree- ments can be prepared, but they can only be decided after face-to-face meetings of the key policymakers. In the case of Iran, it is inconceivable that the final arbiter, Ayatollah Khamenei, would expose himself personally to direct negotia- tions. Nor does President Obama need to participate. But the new president of Iran, who is elected this month, can close the deal with Secretary of State John Kerry (joined, if necessary for reasons of proto- col and Persian pride, by Vice President Joe Biden). Whatever faction he comes from, that leader and his supporters, explicitly backed by the supreme guide, must rise above factional divisions and commit the Iranian state to a binding agreement. Discussion of restoring U.S.- Iran diplomatic relations might then follow. n