The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2013 21 I remember see- ing attitudinal changes among senators who visited the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The doves, hoping to reach arms control agreements, often commented, “The Russians really are nasty and uncooperative.” The hawks, previously convinced of Soviet military superiority, now noticed that the elevators didn’t even work. Myths about Foggy Bottom on the Hill Myth 1: State is disloyal to the administration or has clienti- tis. The late Senator Jesse Helms, R-N.C., a lifelong critic of the State Department, used to complain that “there’s no American desk at State.” He viewed FSOs as lobbyists for foreign govern- ments rather than advocates to those governments for U.S. policies and interests. Sad to say, there is a long record of presidential distrust of the Foreign Service and the State Department, as well. FDR, JFK and Richard Nixon all disparaged U.S. diplomats. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich famously complained that Secretary Colin Powell had “gone native” and was insufficiently supportive of President George W. Bush. Reality: FSOs are professionals who loyally serve whoever is in the White House. Career officials have a duty to give advice when asked (and, equally important, without being asked)—but also to carry out approved policies. The occasional official who leaks damaging information, or otherwise tries to undermine presidential policy, is the very rare exception—and certainly not unique to the State Department. Diplomats can overcome suspicions of clientitis by address- ing local concerns in terms of U.S. interests and opportunities. It also is wise to be careful with wording, making sure “we” always refers to America, not the other country. Myth 2: Diplomats always favor appeasement; they’re not tough. This misguided view arises because diplomats tend to prefer engagement and continued discussion with an adver- sary instead of a severing of relations. The essence of diplo- macy is discussion leading to negotiations and compromises. Hardliners and purists never want to talk to bad guys; they hope that threats and ultimatums will be sufficient. Rarely is that true. Reality: There is ample evidence in recent U.S. history that civilian officials have been more hawkish, more ready to use military force, than the military. Diplo- mats aren’t afraid of the application of force; they just want that option to be in the background to give them leverage for agree- ments that can make force unnecessary. Lawmakers need to understand that diplomacy—just like legislation—requires contact and nuance, as well as the explo- ration of options in a search for areas of agreement. Sometimes bluster works, but it can also be counterproductive. Myth 3: We spend too much on foreign aid and other inter- national activities. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the American people stubbornly believe that foreign aid accounts for between 10 and 20 percent of the federal budget. It is the only federal program that regularly receives “cut” judgments from overwhelming majorities in those surveys. Reality: Total allocations for all U.S. international activities— including running the State Department and related agencies, foreign assistance, contributions to international organizations, etc.—amount to only about 1 percent of federal spending. The politicians should know this, since they appropriate the funds, but many of them apparently don’t. It will take a sustained education campaign to overcome the public igno- rance about the level of spending on foreign relations. It will be even harder to overcome public anger over examples of failed programs and scandals, which seem to be unavoidable in for- eign assistance. In the short run, lawmakers need to focus on specific programs, and their strengths and weaknesses, rather than just criticizing generic “foreign aid.” Two Cultures that Don’t Always Clash While the world looks different from the eastern and western ends of the National Mall, there are actually many similarities between the congressional and diplomatic cultures. Both diplomats and legislators are dealmakers: the former with other nations and their interagency counterparts, the latter with their colleagues from other states, districts and parties. Each holds reaching agreements as a major measure of merit. Both groups—unlike, say, the uniformed military—are comfortable with ambiguity. Nuance is not a dirty word, for One of Congress’ greatest shortcomings is failing to clean up the rabbit warren represented by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.