The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2013 23 how the Hill works, and who has what kind of power and prejudice—just as they would want to know about officials in the country where they’re posted. The appropriations committees are extremely powerful because no money can be spent by the executive branch except through their bills. Members of the foreign policy (authorizing) com- mittees have different ways to influence the State Depart- ment, and they are more concerned with policy than money issues. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “Know your overseer, or he may become your enemy.” What Congress Needs to Know about State State needs resources, authority and maneuvering room to be effective. Just before the Korean War, the State Department budget, including foreign aid and other international activities, equaled half the Pentagon budget. Now it’s about 6 percent of it. The nearly 7,000 generalists in the Foreign Service are outnumbered by the members of military bands, or the military officers at the rank of colonel or Navy captain. They carry almost the whole load of diplomacy and international engage- ment on their shoulders, flying coach when their military equivalents have their own jets. Quality people cost money. More secure embassies cost money. Simply handling the routine diplomacy of a super- power that has recognized 185 countries costs money. And if State is to do what many commissions and think-tanks recom- mend, it needs even more money to create mid-career training and interagency assignment opportunities. In exchange for the consultation Congress demands, State also wants and needs legal authority to act quickly and flex- ibly when international conditions require. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates frequently lamented the “militarization of foreign policy” that has resulted because the Pentagon had more resources and fewer constraints on using them. Although Congress likes to send signals and draw red lines to coerce foreign governments to do what we’d like, diplomats often need maneuvering room. Premature sanctions imposed by Congress can prevent agreements that might otherwise achieve most, if not all, of what lawmakers want. State needs secrecy for effective diplomacy. The only good to come from the 2011 Wikileaks disclosure of more than 200,000 State Department clas- sified cables was that it demonstrated the skill of foreign reporting by our diplomats. Because these officers were telling Wash- ington unvarnished truths, with no expectation they would be broadcast to the world, the leaks were harmful to U.S. interests in many countries. Confi- dential informants were exposed; U.S. officials had to continue dealing with officials they had secretly labeled corrupt; and various nations retaliated against America or its diplomats. Members of Congress may feel free to offer their own opin- ions on U.S. foreign policy, but they need to treat secrets as secret, especially during the course of diplomacy. Premature disclosure of a policy change can be just as detrimental to U.S. interests as discussing military plans and maneuvers. Letters aren’t laws; congressional statements aren’t official policy. Many foreign governments overreact to statements made by members of Congress, treating them as if they reflect presidential policies. Those lawmakers want to be influential, of course; they want to be heard and heeded. Letters, hearings and group statements are all part of the congressional toolkit to influence policymakers at home and abroad. Sometimes that’s all that’s necessary to nudge a foreign leader or the U.S. president to do what the person on the Hill wants. Above all, lawmakers need to remember that, unless the law is changed or the money specifically approved for some new purpose, the executive branch is in charge of U.S. foreign policy. Too often legislators like to posture, passing “sense of Congress” measures that have no real force and effect on policy but cause problems abroad for America and its diplomats. Whatever you think of Armenian genocide, for example, a formal congressional vote on the issue wouldn’t help anyone caught up in the ethnic atrocities nearly a century ago. But it would likely immediately endanger U.S. relations with Turkey today. There are many more issues that could be addressed by peo- ple on Capitol Hill and in Foggy Bottom to improve relations and bridge the cultural divide. But my hope is that identifying and debunking myths held by both sides will help clear the air, and these tips for improving interactions between lawmakers and diplomats will help everyone play nicer together. n Instead of begrudging visits by codels and staffdels, FSOs should see them as opportunities to deepen support for the Foreign Service.