The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

46 JUNE 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL AFSA NEWS The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is the largest bureau in the department, and one of the fastest growing. It is home to a wide variety of specialists, including special agents, security engineers, security technical special- ists and couriers. Its role has evolved substantially over the past decade, and its relationship with the rest of the department is so complex that I have put off writing about it because even a dozen monthly columns would barely scratch the surface. But DS employees make up a significant number of AFSA's constituents, and DS is central to State’s mission. So, as I near the end of my term, I want to devote this column to a brief overview of the issues it handles. There is an inherent and necessary tension between the core mission of DS and the practice of diplomacy. DS is, appropriately, uncom- promising in its efforts to protect safety and national security. But other sections of each post must be equally uncompromising in seeking to interact with host-country populations. Balancing these conflicting missions is achieved, in part, by having the regional security officer report to the deputy chief of mission, rather than the management officer, and by greater delegation of authori- ties to emergency action committees. Diplomatic Security from 60,000 Feet STATE VP VOICE | BY DANIEL HIRSCH AFSA NEWS Views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the AFSA State VP. Even so, few officers have the full range of information, knowledge and experience to weigh the risks completely— nor the resources or author- ity to address every risk. Washington must therefore either more forcefully back the decisions of those that do, or, with full input from all players, transparently do so itself. Either way, it must ensure that the decision makers have the authority to effect change, and not merely responsibility for doing so. The bureau’s mission requires specialized and, sometimes, proprietary skills not generally possessed by employees outside DS. Many of these skills are minimally introduced in schools or training and, instead, must be mastered through experi- ence. An ever-increasing range of responsibilities necessarily requires exposing RSOs—the generalists of the DS world—to take on an ever- increasing range of duties. For these reasons, DS manages the careers and assignments of its employ- ees more tightly than other bureaus. Its leadership asserts that the process is collaborative, transparent and necessary to ensure that all employees gain needed experience—but employees complain of limited bidding options, reduced ability to chart their own careers, fewer out-of-cone possi- bilities and susceptibility to front-office favorites. AFSA has seen occasional indica- tions of assignments being made to reward or punish employees. DS's mission also requires procedures and certifications that impact duty-station, availability, work-life balance, Special-Agent Law Enforce- ment Availability Pay and other issues. Several func- tions require special suit- ability determinations, such as fitness-for-duty examina- tions. Others impose unique reporting requirements; for example, a requirement that special agents report medications they are taking to supervisors and the Office of Medical Services. These may be written into standard operating procedures, or the Foreign Affairs Manual sec- tions, or left undefined, and may even give an individual the ability to decide the fate of a subordinate at will. On the whole, our concern is that DS employees do not always appear to enjoy the protec- tions guaranteed by stan- dardized human resources practices. DS special agents may face legal issues other FS members do not, including rules for carrying firearms. Unique rules apply to employees authorized to carry arms. For these rea- sons, among others, SAs are held to “higher standards” in certain areas of conduct. This makes it all the more vital to ensure transparent, written explanations of expectations of DS employees. For a number of reasons, including limited resources, the need to prioritize basic training of new hires, the need to staff high-risk posts, and perception among SAs that other work is more “promotable,” most SAs do not receive adequate con- tinuing training in criminal investigations, and only superficial training, if any, in the separate discipline of security clearance investiga- tions. The domestic offices where such skills are honed are equally considered less- desirable postings. A lower focus on investigations than on management or protec- tion affects all subjects of DS investigations—DS and other employees alike. Finally, AFSA has concerns about techniques some- times used in investigations, and about instances where investigative reports seem narrowly focused or contain opinions that could preju- dice a case. The Office of the Inspector General has noted a lack of standardization and the possibility for influence by others in the chain of command. This is especially important in administra- tive cases, which offer fewer safeguards and protections to the employee than crimi- nal cases. The long-planned construction of a DS training facility and greater focus on, and institutional support for, the investigative function, would help. n