The Foreign Service Journal, June 2013

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2013 9 with some of his assertions. Amb. Ray is certainly correct in diag- nosing the fundamental issue: Foreign Service influence on our foreign policy has eroded over the past several decades. But I would suggest the causes he cites are largely overstated. In addition, after noting what seems to me to be the foremost fac- tors—the growing polarization of Ameri- can society and the encroachment of political appointees into State Department leadership positions—he then dismisses them as insignificant. It is true, as Amb. Ray asserts, that political leaders would prefer a career Foreign Service that carries out its policies without question. There is nothing new about that. But what is dif- ferent may be the strength with which that preference, which varies with adminis- trations, is expressed. When I entered the Foreign Service, during the Kennedy administration, it was a central tenet that we owed the political leadership our best analysis and policy options, regardless of domestic politics. This ethic was reiterated to me at post after post, as well as in Wash- ington. Perhaps my supervisors happened to be ethical giants, but my experience suggests they were the rule rather than the exception. They also made clear to me that once a policy decision was made, it was to be carried out to the letter. However, it was acceptable—I cannot say encouraged— to question the decision before carrying it out if one felt strongly, and these chal- lenges occasionally carried the day. For that reason, the assertion that the Foreign Service as a whole is “conflict averse” is utter nonsense. Certainly, there have always been some FSOs who meet that definition, and perhaps too many of them attain positions of too much influence. But to suggest that they ever predominated is untrue. Moreover, many names leap to mind that dispel this claim. Similarly, Amb. Ray’s assertion that the FS is institutionally risk-averse also strikes me as a canard. Yes, there are many FSOs who fit that description, but by no means a majority (at least in my experience). At every post at which I served, as well as back in Foggy Bottom, I was constantly impressed by the thoughtful, innovative and mold-breaking ideas, suggestions, arguments and actions my colleagues advanced. After being thoughtfully examined and considered, many—perhaps most—of those ideas failed for what seemed perfectly valid reasons. Not all brainstorms are worth adopting, after all, and some that do pass scrutiny bring significant unin- tended consequences. Amb. Ray may nonetheless be correct that such suggestions are too often dismissed without adequate examination. But that does not mean that if adopted, they would have been successful. Almost invariably, at least in my experi- ence, the failure to assay these suggestions was driven by political considerations, and by political appointees who were able to stop any process they did not like. I saw this in both the Latin American and European bureaus, and heard of similar situations in most other bureaus. (The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs was notori- ous in this regard during the George W. Bush administration.) In sum, while I share several of Amb. Ray’s concerns, I believe his analysis is flawed. He properly identifies the core problems—increased domestic polariza- tion and political infiltration at the State Department’s policy level, displacing