The Foreign Service Journal, June 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JUNE 2015 47 kept as control mechanisms. Under caudillo rule, corruption is endemic, beginning with the legal system. The rule of law cannot exist without strong, independent politi- cal, judicial and social institutions because the law is never self-imple- menting. It requires agents to make, interpret and execute it. In successful modern societies, separate civil institutions perform the three functions. Dictators, however, usurp all three. Caudillos come in all shapes, sizes and flavors. They are tacti- cally smart, if superficial, thinkers, who borrow ideologies that reflect the temper of their times. Early in the 20th century, they adopted national-socialist, right-of-center ideologies (e.g., Peron, Trujillo, Somoza, Batista). With fascism discredited, later caudillos embraced Marxism (e.g., Castro, Ortega, Chavez, Morales; Pino- chet is the exception). Wherever they are on the political spectrum, caudillos practice populism and repression. Most are initially elected, but as their popularity weakens, they use brute force. Peaceful transitions are possible, but unusual. A century ago, Argentina was considered the rising power of the hemisphere. But personalismo has so stifled Argentine politics that institutions cannot stabilize and modernize the nation. Peronism has been a populist political force in Argentina for 70 years; yet Peron has been dead for more than 40 years. Successive Peronist leaders freely redefine the term to suit their needs, and the party dutifully follows. “Bolivarianismo,” espoused in Venezuela by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, is named for a caudillo who has been dead for nearly 200 years. (Imagine a U.S. president governing on a political platform of “George Washingtonism.”) Chávez wrapped himself in reflected glory for political ends, a recipe for instability and cor- ruption. Caudillismo persists in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. The Alternative: Democratic Institutionalism The second path, democratic institutionalism, is less firmly rooted in Latin American history, although democratic ideals go back to the independence period. Only after World War II did it gain traction, albeit still the weaker tradition, with an uncertain future. But recently, support for democratic institutions has shown significant growth and electoral success in several countries. In modern democracies, independent institutions (aka “civil society”) are the foundation of political and economic order, and of social conventions. They support relatively stable, predictable, fair and peaceful processes. Laws and institutions take precedence over leaders. Leaders are subject to politi- cal processes they cannot control (elections, courts, individual liberty) or only partially control (legislation, regulations, appointments to office). Civil institutions are influenced in return, but they have indepen- dent interests, perspectives and objectives. When developed, democratic institutionalism is stable and progressive because it creates “countervailing power” by dis- tributing power widely. It takes time to develop institutions, and even more time to develop a tradition of relying on them—but eventually a tradition alters attitudes and values, and becomes the dominant culture. It is time for this “hemisphere of liberty,” as Germán Arciniegas called it, to reexamine what constitutes the true foundations of democracy. Free and fair elections are neces- sary; but they are indicators, not proof, of democracy. After all, a nation can organize fair elections while being fleetingly demo- cratic, or undemocratic. Multiple, independent institutions are democracy’s anchors. They are accountable to, and respond to, the needs of different sectors of society, but are collectively accountable to the nation. Primary among these are a strong, independent judiciary, an uncorrupted legislature and free-market economic institutions. Without democratic institutionalism, democracy is an illusion or a short-lived phenomenon. Latin America has these institutions, but their influence is limited because many democratic leaders practice personalism and not institutionalism. In Argentina, not all presidents have been caudillos; but the democratic ones have never effectively countered the caudillo tradition. Likewise, Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt was a democrat, but his personalismo lacked focus on the institutions needed to build democracy. Institutionalism is stronger in some countries, and by identifying recent successes and supporting them, we can strengthen maturing democracy. Here are some hopeful and not-so-hopeful examples. The Institutional Approach: Colombia and Chile in the Lead Colombia experienced the caudillismo of the colonial and independence periods, and the 19th century saw partisan warfare over centralism vs. federalism. Cultural change arrived by the 1890s through a conservative oligarchy that ruled for 40 years. Wherever they are on the political spectrum, caudillos practice populism and repression.