The Foreign Service Journal, June 2015

48 JUNE 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL During the 20th century, instead of turning to a caudillo, Colombia has elected leaders who value institutional primacy over per- sonal power. Indeed, for a century, Colombia has had only one dicta- tor, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who was given power in 1953 by the political parties, which then took it away in 1957—a unique occurrence in Latin America. In the 1980s, the country was confused and demoralized by years of murderous guerrilla and mafia violence that caused some Colombians to support “peace at any price.” President Virgilio Barco built a national capability that confronted both threats, convincing the nation that it could defeat them. Then, he stepped down after one term. His three successors likewise each served one constitutionally limited term. The presidency of Colombia is held in greater esteem than any of its incumbents. And all recent incumbents, save Alvaro Uribe, have understood this. Colombia benefits from another strong anchor, as well. From 1933 until 1999, the country enjoyed uninterrupted economic growth. Despite its civil conflicts, it has averaged more than 4-per- cent annual growth since the 1950s. This singular economic feat is mainly due to the country’s respected and well-run government and private economic institutions, which have made Colombia Latin America’s third-largest economy. By the 1980s, brutal assassinations and bribery by narcotraf- fickers weakened Colombia’s judicial institutions and the rule of law. Constitutional reforms in 1991 created a prosecutorial system and strengthened institutions, but did not bend them to executive will. Today the narco-mafias are splintered, the narco-guerrillas are suing for peace, and a solid institutional base exists for long- term political, economic and social growth and stability. Chile’s early history was also steeped in caudillismo. It spent the 19th century enlarging its territory at the expense of its neigh- bors, capping the century with a civil war among its own oligarchs and military. Democratic institutions with a centralized national government developed during the last century, despite twice being interrupted by long military dictatorships. The second, Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup, crushed democracy, but built a strong, “Chicago School” economy, which survived Pinochet’s overthrow in 1990. The economic institutions built in the preceding 70 years were kept by the democratic leaders who followed Pinochet. As in Colombia, the economic base has supported Chile during its last, tumultuous 35 years, allowing it to become a strong institutional- ized democracy with a free-market economic base. A Transition Still In Progress: Mexico Mexico is a society moving toward democratic institutional- ism. For 70 years, Mexico was governed by what Mario Vargas Llosa called “the perfect dictatorship”—uninterrupted single- party rule. The Institutional Revolutionary Party’s goals equaled the nation’s goals; the PRI funded opposition parties; corrup- tion weakened institutions; an educated elite was coopted; and popular discontent was suppressed. Mexico had an uninterrupted string of “six-year caudillos,” as each president served one term and transferred power peacefully. Meanwhile, the United States and other democratic nations dealt with the PRI’s dictatorship as if it were not one. In 1993 and 1994, Presidents Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo led Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agree- ment. NAFTA was a turning point, as its benefits unexpectedly transcended economics, imparting new energy and confidence to Mexico’s growing middle class and private sector. Equally important, after decades of political stagnation, Zedillo addressed serious social problems and conducted free and fair elections. Mexico’s traditional, anti-gringo, “victimization” ideology gave way to flexible realism. The newMexico understands that its future depends on a new path. It is no exaggeration to say that political pluralism and institutional development in Mexico grew from economic modernization. Still, Mexico has a long way to go. The old, ingrained PRI culture resists modernization, and devel- opment varies from region to region and sector to sector. President Enrique Peña Nieto must reassert sovereignty over the narco-mafias because these criminals operate with impunity. Reestablishing government control along the U.S. border and through northern and central Mexico will be difficult, long and bloody. Efforts by the last three presidents to confront the mafias have been greatly complicated by remnants of the decrepit, old culture. Like Colombians, Mexicans can take back their country—but the outcome will remain in question for years. Brazil: A Hesitant Transition South America’s largest country spent most of the past century ruled by civilian or military caudillos, who depended on one national institution: the army. Brazil stagnated under a weak con- It is no exaggeration to say that political pluralism and institutional development in Mexico grew from economic modernization.